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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses a capabilities-based methodology to determine what gaps exist in 
the military’s current ability to perform maritime homeland defense against 
unconventional and asymmetric opponents.   This approach reveals that including joint 
air assets as part of the maritime defense force can significantly enhance protection of the 
homeland.  In the short term, the military can use air power from each of the services for 
long-range maritime surveillance and interdiction.  Additionally, using aircraft for 
maritime defense combat air patrol provides an effective and efficient last line of defense.  
Over the longer term, an investment in new technologies including non-lethal weapons 
and persistent surveillance platforms can make the joint force an even more effective 
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I. THE MARITIME DEFENSE PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 16 April 1947, an explosion shattered Texas City’s morning calm.  Moored at 
the city dock, the French-owned merchant vessel SS Grandcamp caught fire in the early 
morning hours.  Although the city fire department responded en masse, their efforts were 
in vain.  At 9:12 a.m., the vessel’s deadly cargo of ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploded 
with tremendous force.   The resultant blast destroyed the dock, a nearby chemical 
company, and heavily damaged the remainder of the city’s industrial area.  “Fragments of 
iron, parts of the ship’s cargo, and dock equipment were hurled into businesses, houses, 
and public buildings.”1  Even worse, the explosion ignited another nearby vessel, the 
High Flyer, also carrying ammonium nitrate.  Most of Texas City’s firefighting 
equipment was destroyed by the Grandcamp explosion.  With no means to subdue the 
growing inferno, the High Flyer continued to burn and eventually detonated at 1:10 a.m. 
the following morning.2  The two explosions killed over 575 people and injured 3,500.  
Property damage from the blasts totaled over $700 million in 1997 dollars.3    
The death and destruction caused by the accidental blasts of the Grandcamp and 
High Flyer bring into sharp relief the potential vulnerability of America to non-traditional 
means of maritime attack.  Enemies of the United States could cause a massive carnage 
and untold economic damage either by exploding a ship laden with combustible materials 
or by using a vessel to deliver a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  As a 2003 U.S. 
Department of Transportation study found, the detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major  
 
 
                                                 
1 Texas State Historical Association, “Texas City Disaster,” Handbook of Texas Online (Texas State 
Historical Association and the University of Texas: 6 June 2001), available from 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/ handbook/online/articles/TT/lyt1.html (accessed 14 March 2006). 
2 Ibid. 
3 New York Times, “50 Years Later, Texas Town Recalls Horrors of Deadly Blast,” East Coast late 
edition, 16 April 1997), A12. 
2 
U.S. port could cost between “hundreds of billions to trillions” of dollars.4  These 
staggering potential costs from asymmetric enemy attacks elevate the maritime homeland 
defense mission to critical importance.   
Conducting effective maritime homeland defense is a difficult and complex 
mission.  In particular, the size of the maritime domain and the volume of traffic through 
it make detecting unconventional attacks on the U.S. homeland problematic.  This thesis 
will argue that while naval surface and sub-surface forces are indispensable to the 
maritime homeland defense mission, augmenting these forces with air power—regardless 
of service affiliation—can significantly enhance U.S. maritime defense.  Using a 
capabilities-based planning construct, this thesis will show that significant gaps currently 
exist between U.S. maritime defense needs and capabilities.  It will argue that using the 
speed, range, and flexibility of air power for maritime defense reduces these gaps 
significantly.  Still, adopting innovative concepts of operation that leverage current 
capabilities goes only so far.  Accordingly, this thesis will also identify areas where 
technological innovations are required to make the joint force an even more effective 
guarantor of U.S. maritime security.  To lay the foundation for these arguments, an 
examination of the contemporary maritime defense environment is first necessary. 
B.   THE CONTEMPORARY MARITIME DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT 
In most previous conflicts, conventional forces from both sides waged a largely 
symmetric war.  In contrast, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism correctly 
notes that today’s enemy “is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by 
modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between 
groups.”5  This networked structure gives terrorists certain operational characteristics.6   
Not only can networked organizations be highly efficient, but “[t]hey know how to 
swarm and disperse, penetrate and disrupt, connect and disconnect, as well as elude and 
                                                 
4 Clark C. Abt, The Economic Impact of Nuclear terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an 
Age of Seaport Vulnerability (Cambridge, MA:  Abt Associates, 30 April 2003), available from 
http://abtassociates.com/ reports/ES-Economic_Impact_of_Nuclear_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf (accessed 14 
March 2006). 
5 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C:  The White House, 
February 2003), 10. 
6 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 170, for a discussion of al Qaeda’s networked structure. 
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evade.”7  The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the potential power of this networked way of 
war.  On that day, “transnational terrorists, organized in widely dispersed, networked 
nodes, swarm[e]d together swiftly, on cue, then pulse[d] to attack simultaneously.”8   
While terrorists used aircraft to attack on 9/11, adversaries could easily adapt a 
networked mode of attack to the maritime domain.  This maritime environment is an 
appealing medium of attack for three primary reasons.  First, the vastness of the maritime 
domain protects the attacker from detection.  Its sheer size makes it difficult to locate an 
attacker.  To put this problem in perspective, the U.S. has over 95,000 miles of shoreline, 
over 1000 harbor channels, and more than 300 ports it needs to protect.9  Additionally, 
the U.S. Coast Guard polices 3.5 million square miles of ocean area performing its 
maritime security mission.10  This massive area includes the U.S. economic exclusion 
zone, which extends 200 miles offshore and is home to vital natural resources.   
Second, the volume of traffic in the maritime domain insulates attackers from 
detection.  Defenders must be able to identify attackers amidst a backdrop littered with 
commercial traffic.  According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, over 46,000 vessels carried 5.8 billion tons of goods in 2001.11  Annually, 
the U.S. marine transportation system moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and 
international freight, imports 3.3 billion barrels of oil, transports 134 million passengers 
by ferry, and hosts more than 5 million cruise ship passengers.12  In 2003 approximately 
6,000 vessels made nearly 60,000 stops in U.S. ports.13  Each day over 200 commercial 
                                                 
7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Underside of Netwar,” Review - Institute of Public Affairs 
54, iss. 4 (December 2002), 3. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 U.S. Department of Transportation, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System:  A 
Report to Congress (Washington, D.C:  U.S. Department of Transportation, September 1999), 8, available 
from http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/MTSreport/mtsfinal.pdf (accessed 16 March 2006). 
10 Maryann Lawlor, “Maritime Defense Undergoes All-hands Evolution,” Signal 58, no. 3 (Nov 
2003), 54. 
11 Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz, “Terror at Sea:  The Maritime Threat,” online article (Herzliya, 
Israel:  The Institute for Counterterrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, 25 April 2005), available 
from http://www.ict.org.il/ articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=532 (accessed 16 March 2006). 
12 U.S. Department of Transportation, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System, 8. 
13 John F. Fritelli, Port and Maritime Security:  Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress, RL 31733 (Washington, D.C:  Library of Congress, updated 27 May 2005), 2. 
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vessels and 21,000 containers arrive at 185 U.S. deepwater ports.14  Even the relatively 
small port at Texas City, rebuilt following the Grandcamp and High Flyer explosions, 
hosts 22 vessels and 60 million tons of cargo every day.15  This background noise affords 
attackers a degree of anonymity that protects them from detection.   
Finally, the maritime medium provides ready access to several high impact target 
sets.  The U.S. maritime transportation system consists of more than “25,000 miles of 
inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways . . . with more than 3,700 terminals that 
handle passenger and cargo movements.  The waterways and ports link to 152,000 miles 
of rail, 460,000 miles of pipelines, and 45,000 miles of interstate highways.”16  Major 
ports abut major cities and associated infrastructure.  The Department of Transportation 
found that in certain scenarios, maritime attacks could result in as many as one million 
deaths and direct property damage could reach $500 billion.  Furthermore, attacks via the 
maritime domain have the potential to ravage world-wide trade and wreck the world 
economy.  The costs of the initial trade disruption from an attack on a port could reach as 
high as $200 billion, with indirect economic costs reaching up to $1.4 trillion.17 
Given this lucrative target set, the United States faces a wide array of potential 
attack methods from both state and non-state actors.  The most commonly discussed 
methods of attack fall into four main categories:  using a commercial vessel as a launch 
platform, using a commercial vessel as a weapon delivery system, using a commercial 
vessel as a weapon, and maritime infiltration of weapons or personnel.18   
1. Using a Commercial Vessel as a Launch Platform 
Conventional U.S. naval superiority could lead attackers to disguise their attack 
by launching weapons such as cruise missiles from military or commercial vessels.19  
                                                 
14 Guy Thomas, “A Maritime Traffic-Tracking System:  Cornerstone of Maritime Homeland 
Defense,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), 139. 
15 Thomas, 139. 
16 U.S. Department of Transportation, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System, 8. 
17 Abt, 4. 
18 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, D.C: 
U.S. Department of Defense, June 2005), 16, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National 
Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C:  Department of Homeland Security, September 2005), 3-
5. 
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 16. 
5 
Although adversaries could elect to use other weapons, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) has found that nation-states may acquire cruise missiles “as a cost 
effective means of ‘leveling the playing field’ against more advanced militaries.”20  
Additionally, the CRS argues that cruise missiles are appealing to authoritarian regimes 
because they provide a higher degree of control:  cruise missiles “are incapable of 
desertion.”21  Non-state groups might be inclined to use cruise missiles as they comport 
with their preferences for using cheap and easily accessible weapons and technologies.”22  
In 2002, then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet stated that “[b]y 
the end of the decade, LACMs [land attack cruise missiles] could pose a serious threat to 
not only our deployed forces, but possibly even the US mainland.”23  According to the 
National Intelligence Council, by 2015 the United States can expect cruise missiles to be 
“capable of delivering WMD [weapons of mass destruction] or conventional payloads” 
against fixed targets.  “Major air and sea ports, logistics bases and facilities, troop 
concentrations, and fixed communications nodes increasingly will be at risk.”24   
Once state or non-state actors make the decision to acquire cruise missiles, they 
will have little difficulty obtaining them.25  Proliferation is difficult to monitor, since 
cruise missile production utilizes many commercially available aviation technologies.  As 
the CRS found: 
Missile airframes, navigation systems, jet engines, satellite maps, and 
mission planning computers and software all can be purchased on the 
                                                 
20 Christopher Bolkcom, Congressional Research Service, “Statement before the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Hearing 
on Cruise Missile Proliferation,”  11 June 2002, 2, available from http://www.senate.gov/ 
~gov_affairs/061102bolkcom.pdf (accessed 17 March 2006). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 1. 
23 George J. Tenet, “Worldwide Threat - Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” Testimony of the 
Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 19 March 2002, available 
from http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.html (accessed 
17 March 2006). 
24 National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Global Trends 2015:  A Dialogue About 
the Future with Non-government Experts (Washington, D.C:  Central Intelligence Agency, December 
2000), 60, available from http://www.odci.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf (accessed 17 
March 2006). 
25 Some argue terrorists would have difficulty acquiring and employing cruise missiles against the 
United States.  See R.B. Watts, “Fight Them Forward,” Strategic Insights IV, iss. 7 (July 2005), available 
from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Jul/wattsJul05.pdf (accessed 17 March 2006). 
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commercial market. Cruise missile technology “hides in plain sight” – 
making it difficult to identify a military program. At the same time, 
commercial availability generally means relatively low-cost weapons for 
many nations and, potentially, non-state actors.26 
Furthermore, according to a Center for Defense Information report, over 80,000 
cruise missiles of 75 different types are currently deployed in at least 81 countries.  
Although most of these are short range systems with a range of 100 km or less, “a ship-
launched 100 km missile . . . could still reach the homeland.”27  Once launched, the small 
size and low altitude of cruise missiles makes them difficult to detect, track and intercept 
even under ideal conditions.28  
2. Using a Commercial Vessel as a Weapon Delivery System 
In the second potential method of maritime attack, enemies could strike the U.S. 
using commercial vessels as a primitive means of weapons delivery.   Attackers could 
easily conceal a high-yield conventional weapon or WMD onboard a ship.  Simply 
piloting the ship into a high-volume commercial port and detonating this weapon would 
produce significant physical and economic damage.29  Several states are suspected of 
WMD proliferation, including three known state sponsors of terrorism:  Iran, Libya and 
Sudan.30  In April 2004, General Leon LaPorte, commander of U.S. forces in the 
Republic of Korea, said “a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist organization is one 
of our greatest concerns. And given the history of North Korea relative to selling missiles 
and missile technology, it's a concern we must address.”31  Sandy Berger, National 
Security Advisor for President Clinton, offered a similar assessment:  “[t]he one country 
                                                 
26 Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni, Cruise Missile Proliferation, CRS Report for 
Congress, RS21252 (Washington, D.C:  Library of Congress, 3 July 2002), p 2. 
27 David Isenberg, “The Real Missile Threat:  Cruise, non Ballistic,” online article (Washington, D.C:  
Center for Defense Information, 8 July 2002), available from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/cruise-pr.cfm 
(accessed 17 March 2006). 
28 United States General Accounting Office, “Cruise Missile Defense:  Progress Made but Significant  
Challenges Remain,” report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 1999, 3, available from 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ ns99068.pdf (accessed 17 March 2006). 
29 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 3-5. 
30 Counterterrorism Office, U.S. State Department, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” available from 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed 2 December 2005). 
31 General Leon J. Laporte, quoted in Bill Gertz, “North Korea, Al Qaeda Union a Threat,” 
Washington Times, online edition, 1 April 2004, available from http://www.washtimes.com/ 
national/20040331-105348-4826r.htm (accessed 1 December 2005). 
7 
that we know has the capacity, and conceivably the inclination, actually to sell a working 
nuclear weapon to a terrorist group is North Korea. . . . Pyongyang is now capable of 
producing, and potentially selling, up to six nuclear weapons at any time -- possibly 20 a 
year by the end of this decade . . . .”32   
Terrorists could also attempt to acquire WMD without the assistance of a state 
sponsor.  As early as 1993, al Qaeda associates were attempting to acquire weapons-
grade uranium on the black market.33  In a May 1998 Al Qaeda statement titled “The 
Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” Osama bin Laden stated “it is the duty of the Muslims to 
prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.”34  Al Qaeda 
spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith’s 2002 statement on his organization’s thinking with 
respect to WMD is chilling:  
We have the right to kill 4 million Americans - 2 million of them children 
- and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of 
thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and 
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have 
afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans'] chemical and biological 
weapons.35 
Documentary evidence shows Al Qaeda is not all rhetoric, either.  In Pakistan, 
CNN found an abandoned house that contained “a 25 page document with information 
about nuclear weapons design.”36  The organization has also been actively pursuing 
chemical and biological weapons.  Coalition forces found a 10-volume "Encyclopedia of 
                                                 
32 Samuel R. Berger, “Foreign Policy for a Democratic President,” Foreign Affairs 83, iss. 3 (May 
June 2004), 47. 
33 Colum Lynch, "Bin Laden Sought Uranium, Jury Told; Material Said to be from South Africa 
Offered for $1.5 Million, Ex-Associate Testifies," The Washington Post, 8 February 2001.  See also, 
Stephan Leader, “Osama Bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, no. 
6 (June 1999), available from http://www8.janes.com (accessed 30 November 2005). 
34 Grand Jury Indictment of Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali, et al, in Yonah Alexander and 
Michael S. Swetnam.  Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network (Ardsley, New York:  
Transnational Publishers, 2001), appendix 3, 5. 
35 Suleiman Abu Gheith, quoted in “Why We Fight America:  Al-Qa’ida Spokeman Explains 
September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million American with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Special Dispatch, no. 388 (12 June 2002), available from 
http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi ?Page=archives&ID=SP38802 (accessed 30 November 2005). 
36 Jack Bourston, “Assessing Al Qaeda’s WMD Capabilities,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 7 (September 
2002), available from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept02/wmd.asp#references (accessed 
17 March 2006). 
8 
Afghanistan Resistance" near Jalalabad that contained “precise formulas for 
manufacturing toxins, botullinum, and ricin.”37  
States that acquire WMD also possess the ability to deliver it via non-traditional 
maritime means, such as a merchant vessel.  For terrorist organizations, the problem is 
somewhat more complicated.  Although some report that al Qaeda may have as many as 
23 freighters at its disposal, the U.S. government closely monitors those vessels.38  If 
prevented from using one of its own vessels to deliver weapons, terrorists could hijack 
one.  Although piloting an ocean freighter is not an easily acquired skill, there are reports 
of pirates boarding vessels and practicing steering “at various speeds for several hours.”39  
Legal means of acquiring ship-driving skills are also available.  In November 2002, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) arrested a suspected al Qaeda operative after he attempted 
to acquire an international seaman’s license.40 
3. Using a Commercial Vessel as a Weapon 
Even without acquiring WMD or high-yield conventional explosives, terrorists 
able to take control of an ocean freighter could use a third attack method.  Any large 
commercial vessel represents a potential weapon in and of itself.  Scuttling a vessel in a 
key sea lane or port could cause extensive economic harm without the use of any other 
explosive device.41  If laden with hazardous or explosive materials, the effect could be 
much more dramatic.  By way of comparison, the destruction of the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City was affected by three tons of ammonium nitrate.  The 
Grandcamp contained 2,300 tons when it exploded in the Texas City Harbor,42 and the 
Grandcamp was a small merchant ship by today’s standards. 
                                                 
37 Bourston, “Assessing Al Qaeda’s WMD Capabilities.” 
38 James Russell and Illiana Bravo, “Homeland Defense:  Ramping Up, But What’s the Glidepath,” 
Strategic Insights 1, no. 1 (March 2002), available from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/mar02/ 
homeDefense.asp (accessed 17 March 2006).  See also, Colin Robinson, “Al Qaeda’s ‘Navy’ – How Much 
of a Threat,” online article (Washington, D.C:  Center for Defense Information, 20 August 2003), available 
from  http://www.cdi.org/ friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1644 (accessed 15 March 2006), 
and Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “How Al Qaeda might strike the US by sea,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, 15 May 2003, 2. 
39 Fritelli, 7. 
40 Patrick E. Tyler, “Qaeda Suspect was Taking Flight Training Last Month,” New York Times, late 
East coast ed., 23 December 2002, A17. 
41 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 3-5. 
42 New York Times, “50 Years Later,” A12. 
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Even more disconcerting, former White House counterterrorism director Richard 
Clarke charged that after the Millennium terrorist threat, the government learned that al 
Qaeda-affiliated terrorists had “infiltrated Boston by coming in on liquid natural gas 
[LNG] tankers from Algeria … [and] had one of the giant tankers blown up in the harbor, 
it would have wiped out downtown Boston.”43  A Sandia National Laboratories report 
confirms this assessment.44  Attackers could use any large ship “as a collision weapon for 
destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront.”45  Indeed, in April 2006, a 
600-foot cargo ship overshot its dock in the Boston Harbor, missing the city’s LNG 
terminal by a margin of only 200 feet.46  While this incident was unintentional, it 
highlights the ready availability and vulnerability of critical infrastructure to terrorist 
attack via hijacked vessels.   
4. Maritime Infiltration of Weapons or Personnel 
Finally, if attackers cannot gain control of large commercial vessels, they could 
use smaller ships or private vessels to smuggle personnel or weapons into the United 
States.47  With 95,000 miles of coastline, numerous unmonitored beachheads would 
allow infiltrators to bypass customs and immigration authorities.  According to a New 
York State Office of Homeland Security study on maritime terrorism, al Qaeda might 
have used one of its freighters, the Seastar, to deliver explosives to Saudi Arabia in 1995 
for a car bomb attack.  Another freighter may have delivered explosives for the bombings 
of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.48  Additionally, if the al 
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Qaeda associate detained by UAE in November 2002 had successfully obtained his 
international seaman’s license, he would have been able to enter any port in the world 
without having to acquire a visa.49 
Stowaways on large vessels present another means for infiltrating personnel into 
the United States.  In April 2006, twenty-two Chinese nationals were arrested in the Port 
of Seattle for attempting to smuggle themselves into the United States in a 40-foot cargo 
container.  The eighteen men and four women had spent fifteen days in the container on 
board the China Shipping vessel CSCL Rotterdam while it sailed from Shanghai.  
Fortunately, port security officials spotted the stowaways and summoned U.S. Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP) personnel.50  Although the CBP does not suspect this group had 
any hostile intentions, the situation highlights the ease by which less-benign groups could 
bypass normal immigration channels. 
In addition to the four primary maritime attack methods discussed above, 
terrorists could choose to directly engage military or commercial vessels using suicide 
bombers or other means.  Indeed, the attacks on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 
and the French oil tanker M/V Limberg two years later are examples of this type of 
engagement.51  Nonetheless, such attacks are best thwarted through maritime security 
measures.  Developing countermeasures for these types of maritime attacks is beyond the 
scope of the maritime defense mission, defined as “the protection of US sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats 
and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.”52  Accordingly, this thesis 
will not address defending against these types of attacks. 
C. CONCLUSION 
A brief examination of the contemporary maritime defense environment reveals a 
vast area of responsibility ripe for exploitation by asymmetric means.  The consequences 
of a successful maritime attack on the U.S. could be catastrophic.  According, all 
elements of military power merit consideration for this crucial mission area.  Careful 
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51 Frittelli, 6. 
52 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. 
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consideration might reveal that surface or sub-surface forces are best suited for the 
maritime defense mission.  Equally plausible, however, is that airpower—with its 
inherent speed, range, and flexibility—can make an important contribution to this 
mission.   
Determining whether or not (and how) air power could and should be used for 
maritime defense requires several sequential steps.  First, reviewing historical and current 
thinking on the use of air power in the maritime domain lays a foundation for 
understanding both the capabilities as well as the limitations of air power in a maritime 
defense role.  Second, a discussion of the capabilities-based planning process and its 
assumptions provides a disciplined methodology for analysis.  Third, assessing maritime 
defense needs and comparing these to current military capabilities reveals where gaps 
exist between the two.  A discussion of possible ways to bridge these gaps reveals 
whether or not air power can contribute to maritime defense.  Finally, a brief examination 
of different capabilities options—including their impact on operations tempo, training 
requirements, and the budget—leads to recommendations as to when and how air power 
could be used for maritime homeland defense. 
12 
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II. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT CONCEPTS FOR THE USE OF 
AIR POWER IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-six years prior to the explosions of the Grandcamp and High Flyer in the 
Texas City harbor, another vessel, the Ostfriesland, sank sixty miles off the coast of 
Virginia after suffering multiple explosions.53  The explosions that rocked the 
Ostfriesland, however, were not caused by the detonation of materials on board.  Rather, 
sinking of the captured German battleship on 21 July 1921 marked the climax of a series 
of joint U.S. Army-Navy maritime bombing tests.  The Ostfriesland succumbed to an 
aerial onslaught from eight Army Martin bomber aircraft based at Langley Field, each 
armed with one specially-constructed two-thousand pound bomb.  The first Martin 
bomber released its weapon from an altitude of 2,500 feet at 12:18 p.m.  Over the next 
ten minutes another five two-thousand pound bombs scored near misses or direct hits on 
the former man-of-war.  Twenty-one minutes after the attack began, “[t]he Ostfriesland 
stood on her port beam ends.  Thirty seconds later she started under the waves with a 
rush, and as her bow turned, large holes were exposed.  At 12:40 . . . the dreadnought 
vanished beneath the surface.”54  Shortly after the sinking, Brigadier General William 
“Billy” Mitchell, deputy chief of the Army Air Service, declared “the problem of 
destruction of seacraft by [air] forces has been solved and is finished. . . .”55    
Mitchell’s declaration was premature.  Attacking ships at sea was and is a 
complex problem requiring two distinct capabilities.  First, an aircraft and its crew must 
find the ship.  Second, they must successfully engage it.  Although the sinking of the 
Ostfriesland tested the later of these capabilities, it largely neglected the former.56  Over 
time, however, the problems of locating and destroying ships at sea have become 
                                                 
53 Alfred P. Hurley, Billy Mitchell:  Crusader for Air Power (New York:  Franklin Watts, 1964), 66. 
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progressively easier.  Examining this history as well as current doctrine and thinking on 
the use of aircraft for maritime defense is the first step in determining an appropriate role 
for air power in this vital mission. 
B.   THE HISTORY OF AIR POWER IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
Following Billy Mitchell’s success in 1921, navies and air forces around the 
world quickly attempted to adapt their tactics and weaponry to the anti-ship mission, 
meeting with only limited success.57  The difficulties inherent in targeting surface vessels 
from the air were clearly apparent during World War II.58  In May 1941, for example, 
British air and naval forces spent four days in attempting to find and destroy the German 
battleship Bismarck.  The chase began on 21 May, when two British Spitfires flying over 
Bergen, Norway, at 25,000 feet photographed what they thought were two cruisers in the 
port.  Post-flight analysis, however, established that one of the vessels was actually the 
Bismarck.59  The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command immediately launched an 
attack on the area, but bad weather precluded the crew from accomplishing their 
mission.60  On 22 May, the RAF returned to reconnoiter the area.  Unfortunately for the 
British, the concise report from the mission simply stated:  “Battleship and cruiser have 
left.”61   
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Throughout the remainder of the chase, aircraft often sighted the battleship, but 
radar-equipped Royal Navy vessels performed most of the tracking.62   Additionally, 
although an air-delivered torpedo crippled the Bismarck and enabled her final destruction 
from surface fire, poor visibility, heavy anti-aircraft fire, and the battleship’s heavy armor 
precluded any serious damage during most air strikes.63  During one engagement, aircraft 
mistakenly attacked the Royal Navy cruiser shadowing the Bismarck.  Fortunately for the 
Royal Navy—but indicative of air power’s limitations—fusing problems caused several 
of the torpedoes to detonate prematurely, and the cruiser escaped without damage.64 
 
Figure 1.   RAF Reconnaissance Photo of Bismarck (Imperial War Museum)65 
 
The Bismarck episode demonstrated the problems facing aircraft both trying to 
find and trying to sink a large surface vessel.  Yet, even against immobile ships trapped at 
a known location, World War II aircraft met with uneven success.  A telling example of 
air power’s limitations even under these favorable circumstances is the British 
bombardment of the French fleet in July 1940 at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria.  Not wanting the 
French vessels to fall into Nazi hands, the British issued an ultimatum to the French fleet 
to surrender of face destruction.  When the French failed to comply, the Royal Navy 
began the assault.  At least nine dive-bombers were launched as part of this attack, but 
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none succeeded.  Not one of their bombs found its target, and two aircraft were lost to 
anti-aircraft fire.  A subsequent air assault on the evading French capital ship Strasburg 
also failed.66 
Despite these failures, air power did enjoy some successes during World War II.  
For example, counter to air power’s poor performance at Mers-el-Kebir was the Royal 
Navy’s November 1940 air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto harbor. The Taranto 
attack resulted in the sinking or disabling of seven surface vessels, crippling the Italian 
fleet.  The Japanese used the Taranto blueprint to plan their even more spectacular and 
successful attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.67   
The subsequent battle of Midway is also instructive.  In June 1942, as a result of 
breaking Japanese wartime code, the Americans knew an attack on the Midway was 
imminent.68  Knowing the attack was coming from the west, U.S. aircraft still faced the 
monumental task of locating the fleet somewhere in nearly two million square miles of 
sea.  After four days of searching, American aircraft spotted two minesweepers 
approximately 470 miles southwest of Midway and the Japanese transport group 700 
miles to the west of the island.  An unsuccessful B-17 strike on the transport group 
followed later in the day.69  The next day, aircraft located the main Japanese fleet 200 
miles northwest of Midway allowing the battle to “begin in earnest” and ultimately 
resulting in the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers along with several additional 
ships.  Despite the uneven performance of air power prior to the battle, Midway 
ultimately demonstrated that air power could successfully solve the sequential problems 
of finding and engaging the enemy.70   
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Midway was not the only successful case of air power finding and destroying 
ships at sea.  The Japanese followed up their attack on Pearl Harbor by finding and 
destroying the HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse, and Hermes using land-based torpedo 
bombers.71  In the Atlantic theater, the German Luftwaffe met with considerable success 
against Allied merchant ships, sinking 179 vessels totaling 545,000 tons in the period 
from March through May 1941.72  Allied efforts against the Nazis were even more 
devastating.  Of the 920 sinkings of German coastal traffic during World War II, direct 
air attack and mining claimed 77.3 percent of the total.73  In the Mediterranean, “Italy 
lost 1,324 ships (totaling 2,106,521 tons) to allied action.”  Of these, air attack destroyed 
489, or 37 percent of the total.74 
Since World War II, the ability of aircraft to locate ships has improved steadily.  
During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Strategic Air Command (SAC) tasked KC-97, 
KC-135, RB-47 and B-52 aircraft to find and identify Soviet ships in the mid-Atlantic.75   
President John F. Kennedy’s assistant naval aid, Commander Gerry McCabe, wrote in his 
diary during the crisis that since naval aircraft were busy hunting Soviet submarines,  
General LeMay offered to have his B-52 bombers ‘locate all the ships in 
the Atlantic within four hours,’ and he kept his promise.  ‘Not only did he 
fly every single plane the Air Force had out over the Atlantic . . . but they 
sent in every single contact report, from a fishing smack, to the biggest 
vessel they could find floating on the Atlantic and they swamped the 
White House Situation Room.’76 
Throughout the crisis, RB-47 aircraft made a total of 374 sightings of Soviet vessels, 
including an urgent response to a U.S. Navy request to locate the Soviet tanker Grozny.  
After finding the vessel, the RB-47 crew circled the ship until a Navy destroyer could 
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intercept it.  Throughout the crisis SAC flew over 5,000 sea-surveillance sorties, 
“demonstrating the enduring value of strategic bombers employed in maritime roles.”77   
Air power also has improved in its ability to engage and destroy surface vessels.  
The 1982 Falklands War illustrated the vulnerability of modern ships to air attack.  After 
being hit by an Argentinean Exocet missile, the HMS Sheffield sank despite the missile’s 
failure to detonate.  All told, the British lost six ships during the conflict,78 but they could 
have fared even worse.  “Fully 55% of Argentine bombs failed to explode even though 
they hit their targets.   Had they [exploded], it is likely that at least six of the other 
thirteen vessels damaged would have been lost.”79  Five years later, the Iraqi engagement 
of the USS Stark (FFG-31) demonstrated the continued efficacy of air power against 
surface ships.  On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter fired two French-made 
Exocet anti-ship missiles at the vessel.  Although the first missile failed to detonate, the 
second exploded three feet inside ship’s skin. The resultant fire reached temperatures of 
1400-1500º F in less than one minute.  The engagement resulted in the loss of thirty-
seven lives and $142 million in damage.80  
 
Figure 2.   USS Stark after being Struck by Iraqi Missiles (USN Photo) 
 
In part as a result of the attack on the Stark, the US Navy has an institutionalized 
respect for airborne threats.  Indeed, just over one year after the crippling of the Stark, the 
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commanding officer of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) cited that incident as part of his 
rationale for engaging what he perceived as a hostile Iranian air threat.81  Unfortunately, 
that threat later proved to be a civilian airliner, Iran flight 655.  Conversely, the Navy has 
also demonstrated its own ability to effectively employ naval air power against enemy 
ships.  The most recent example of this is during the 1991 Gulf War, when naval aircraft 
damaged or destroyed nineteen Iraqi naval vessels on a single day.82 
C.   AIR POWER IN CURRENT MARITIME DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
The steadily improving capabilities of air power to find and destroy surface 
vessels have led to only limited examinations of its role in maritime defense, particularly 
against an asymmetric-type threat.  Most available studies of maritime strategy primarily 
focus on Cold War and post-Cold War conventional maritime defense (or offense).83  
The 1992 naval strategy document From the Sea reoriented the Navy from a blue water 
strategy to one focused on power projection and operations in the littorals.84  U.S. Navy 
Commander Michael Dobbs expanded on the forward presence strategy of From the Sea, 
adopting it to the homeland defense mission.  Dobbs demonstrated the applicability of the 
Navy’s counter-drug efforts to the maritime interdiction mission, and highlighted the 
importance of achieving maritime domain awareness (MDA).85  Unfortunately, however, 
he does not discuss the potential use of air assets in the maritime mission. 
Neglecting to address the use of air power for maritime defense is a common 
oversight.  The few efforts that do discuss air power’s potential in the maritime role do 
not offer any strategic or operational guidance.  Instead, they focus on the use of specific 
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platforms, neglecting broad strategic principles or concepts of operation.86  One Royal 
Air Force author does provide an in-depth discussion of maritime air defense, concluding 
that the advantages of “range, information-processing and weapon-carrying capabilities, 
and flexibility” make land-based aircraft particularly well-suited for this mission.87  
Unfortunately, this work also fails to adequately address strategic or operational 
employment. 
U.S. government strategy documents offer another possible source of guidance for 
maritime defense planning.  Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not 
discuss maritime defense directly, it states the strategic objective of “identifying and 
destroying the threat before it reaches our borders.”88  The U.S. National Defense 
Strategy subsequently identifies the number one strategic objective of the Armed Forces 
as “secur[ing] the United States from direct attack,”89 and it lists air and maritime defense 
as critical components of protecting the homeland.90  The National Military Strategy 
provides slightly more detail, stating that the U.S. will “form an integrated defense of the 
air, land, sea and space approaches in and around US sovereign territory.”  The authors 
continue, stating that “[p]rotecting these strategic approaches requires persistent 
surveillance that allows the United States to identify, continuously track and interdict 
potential threats,” thereby highlighting the critical importance of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance in maritime defense.91   
The Department of Defense’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
details the military’s vision for accomplishing the maritime defense mission.  Following 
the lead of the National Military Strategy, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
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Support outlines the concept of an “active, layered defense.”  This defense “relies on 
early warning of an emerging threat in order to quickly deploy and execute a decisive 
response.”92  Consequently, the authors of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support list as their first objective “achieving maximum awareness of threats.”  They 
further define the desired level of threat awareness as “comprehensive, accurate, timely 
and actionable intelligence and information” that allows warfighters and policymakers to 
identify and respond to threats.93  Meeting this threshold allows accomplishment of a 
second objective, to “deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a safe distance.”  The authors 
acknowledge that to do this the military needs a system that provides situational 
awareness similar to that used for air traffic control and air defense.  However, the only 
discussion of how to actually engage and defeat a maritime threat is a quote from the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  The authors apparently concur with the CNO’s 
statement that “forward deployed naval forces will network with other assets of the Navy 
and Coast Guard . . . to identify, track and intercept threats long before they threaten the 
nation.”94  Later in the document, when discussing the capability to intercept and defeat 
threats in the maritime operational domain, the discussion revolves exclusively around 
using U.S. Navy and Coast Guard forces to conduct maritime defense missions.95  
Building on the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the DoD’s 
Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) document describes the specific operational concepts 
for how the DoD will execute maritime homeland defense.  It describes an 
operationalized mission set for maritime defense comprised of “attack operations, active 
defense, passive defense and C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence].”96  The Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating 
Concept (HLS JOC) also reflects these mission sets in its approach to maritime defense.  
The HLS JOC divides the world into three main areas:  the forward regions, approaches, 
and homeland.  In the forward regions, DoD’s objective is to “detect, deter, prevent, and 
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defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US before they can directly threaten the 
Homeland.”97  The HLS JOC envisions carrying out this mission “independently, through 
preemptive attack (if actionable intelligence is available), or in conjunction with major 
combat operations, stability operations, and/or strategic deterrence.”98  Regrettably, the 
HLS JOC does not delve deeper into the capabilities required to successfully carry out 
such a preemptive attack. 
When discussing homeland defense operations in the approaches, the HLS JOC 
fares only slightly better.  The document begins by describing the approaches as  
a conceptual region extending from the limits of the Homeland to the 
boundaries of the Forward Regions that is based on intelligence – once 
intelligence has indicated a threat is en route to the Homeland, it is 
considered to be in the Approaches.99   
The HLS JOC describes DoD’s objectives in the approaches using the same language as 
it did for the forward regions:  “to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat transiting threats as 
far from the Homeland as possible.” 100  In this section, however, the HLS JOC provides 
a rudimentary discussion of capabilities requirements, stating that DoD can achieve its 
objectives in the approaches “through surveillance and reconnaissance . . . and maritime 
interception.”101  Once a threat penetrates the approaches, the HLS JOC again states that 
DoD requires capabilities to “[d]etect, deter, prevent, and defeat maritime threats to the 
Homeland.”102  Expanding on this objective later in the document, the HLS JOC 
identifies capabilities requirements that include “detection, localization, evaluation, 
sorting, and possible interception, by force if necessary, of maritime traffic to prevent or 
defeat an attack.”103  Nonetheless, the HLS JOC stops short of discussing the specific 
options for filling each of these capabilities requirements for the maritime defense 
mission. 
                                                 
97 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept 
(Washington, D.C:  Department of Defense, February 2004), 3.  Cited hereafter as HLS JOC. 
98 Ibid. 
99 HLS JOC, 3-4. 
100 Ibid., 4. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 21. 
23 
DoD and joint publications do not discuss potential uses of air power for maritime 
defense.  Unfortunately, current Air Force doctrine fares only slightly better.  In 2003, the 
Air Force revised Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1), Air Force Basic Doctrine, 
to include a robust focus on protecting the homeland.  Despite this, AFDD 1 includes 
only one paragraph on countersea operations.  In this single paragraph AFFD 1 states that 
“countersea functions are an extension of Air Force capabilities into a maritime 
environment” and include the tasks of “sea surveillance, antiship warfare [subsequently 
renamed surface warfare], protection of sea lines of communications through 
antisubmarine and antiair warfare, aerial minelaying, and air refueling in support of naval 
campaigns.”104  These tasks are all collateral missions that Department of Defense 
Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 
Components, assigned to the Air Force.105  Sea surveillance and surface warfare are the 
most significant of these collateral missions for homeland defense.   
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.4 (AFDD 2-1.4), Countersea Operations, 
provides definitions for sea surveillance and surface warfare but does not give any further 
doctrinal guidance pertaining to their execution.106   Similarly, AFDD 2-1.4 is silent on 
the operational issues inherent in using air power for maritime defense.  AFDD 2-1.4 
cautions that when USAF assets are operating in the maritime domain, “[c]oordinating, 
synchronizing, and integrating land-based air operations with maritime air and sea 
operations [is] challenging, but necessary.”107  The document’s limited discussion of 
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(JFMCC) coordination concludes that the JFACC should control all air forces, although 
the JFMCC “in some situations, may plan and direct limited Air Force support 
operations.”108 
DoD, joint, and Air Force strategy and doctrine documents do not provide any 
guidance on the appropriate uses of air power in the maritime defense mission.  While 
this could indicate a tacit proscription against using air power for this mission, these 
documents do not offer any reasoning that might support such a claim.  More likely, the 
absence of a strategic or doctrinal discussion on appropriate uses for air power in 
maritime defense represents a void in current operational thought.  To fill this void will 
require a disciplined and methodological approach to the problem of maritime defense.  
Accordingly, a capabilities-based planning methodology will provide the framework for 
enumerating the assumptions and military requirements for maritime homeland defense. 
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III. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) recognized that planning for large conventional wars was no longer adequate to 
defend the nation.  Instead, the report noted, “the United States must identify the 
capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, 
and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.”109  Accordingly, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the U.S. military to adopt a capabilities-based 
approach to planning.  This approach was designed to focus the services “more on how 
an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might 
occur.”110   Outside of this broad definition from the QDR, there is no official DoD 
definition of capabilities-based planning.111  Fortunately, however, unofficial guidance 
on the planning process does exist.   
In a study conducted for the office of the secretary of defense (OSD), Paul K. 
Davis of the RAND Corporation defines capabilities-based planning as “planning, under 
uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges 
and circumstances, while working within an economic framework.”112  Capabilities-
based planning is especially relevant to homeland defense and homeland security.  The 
high degree of uncertainly surrounding asymmetric warfare—whether with another state 
or a non-state actor—challenges planners.  Furthermore, “[a]symmetric threats target 
unappreciated vulnerabilities, and they tend to result in surprise.”113  This uncertainty 
leads planners either to “mirror-image” the threat or focus on more traditional, “proven” 
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threats from nation-states.114  Former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Richards 
Heuer has warned about the pernicious effects of mirror-imaging.  While his comments 
specifically addressed intelligence analysis of state threats, they are equally applicable to 
non-state actors.   
To see the options faced by foreign [or terrorist] leaders as these leaders 
see them, one must understand their values and assumptions and even their 
misperceptions and misunderstandings. Without such insight, interpreting 
foreign [or terrorist] leaders’ decisions or forecasting future decisions is 
often little more than partially informed speculation. Too frequently, 
foreign [or terrorist] behavior appears “irrational” or “not in their own best 
interest.” Such conclusions often indicate analysts have projected 
American values and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign [or terrorist] 
leaders and societies, rather than understanding the logic of the situation as 
it appears to them.115  
Furthermore, as Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss concluded in a study on the use 
of capabilities-based planning for homeland defense, threat-based or scenario-based 
methods fail “because the asymmetric threat cannot be templated and is both uncertain 
and adaptive.”116 
Capabilities-based planning has several advantages over threat- or enemy-specific 
scenario-based planning for homeland defense and security.  Because it focuses the 
planner’s attention on threat capabilities and potential responses instead of particular 
threat nations or groups, capabilities-based planning inherently emphasizes “flexibility, 
robustness, and adaptiveness of capability.”117  Furthermore, because the capabilities-
based construct is an iterative process accounting for both needs and resources 
constraints, it lends itself to a deeper understanding of required capabilities.  This, in turn, 
affords the planner the opportunity to develop several capability options for the decision-
                                                 
114 Bennett, 44. 
115 Richards Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C:  Central Intelligence 
Agency and Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 33, available from https://www.cia.gov/ 
csi/Psychology/PsychofIntelNew.pdf (accessed 27 July 2006). 
116 Thomas J. Goss, Building a Contingency Menu:  Using Capabilities-based Planning for Homeland 
Defense and Homeland Security, Master’s thesis (Monterey, California:  Naval Postgraduate School, March 
2005), 14. 
117 Davis, 4. 
27 
maker.  The decision-maker can then choose what capability best fits not only defense 
needs, but also economic constraints and the acceptable level of risk.118 
B. THE CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING PROCESS 
The RAND Corporation’s capabilities-based planning process is outlined in 
Figure 3.  The first step in this process is to identify plausible threat concerns, and RAND 
suggests doing this by listing several name-level scenarios.  These scenarios should be 
“defined only to the extent of giving them names that indicate broadly the nature of 
conflict being considered.”119  The four maritime defense scenarios discussed in the 
introductory chapter provide the baseline for accomplishing this capabilities-based 
planning step.  Those scenarios were using a commercial vessel as a launch platform, 
using a commercial vessel as a weapon delivery system, using a commercial vessel as a 
weapon, and maritime infiltration of weapons or personnel.  It is important to note that 
changes in intelligence quality, specificity, and timeliness will suggest different 
capability needs in each of these scenarios.120  Thus, including an intelligence warning 
parameter as part of maritime defense scenario development adds a level of sophistication 
and precision to the planning process. 
   
Figure 3.   Capabilities-based Planning Process (RAND Corporation) 
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The second step in the capabilities-based planning process is development of the 
design space.  This design space is simply the area available for problem solving, as 
defined by assumptions.  As such, the design space provides an analytical framework for 
subsequent steps in the planning process.121  According to RAND, the design space for 
capabilities-based planning consists of six primary dimensions: the political-military 
context, enemy objectives and strategies, enemy forces, enemy force effectiveness, the 
environment, and other model assumptions (e.g., the movement speed of maneuver 
forces, real-world weapon effectiveness).122  Defining the design space enables the 
discussion of various concepts of operations (CONOPS) during the next phase of the 
capabilities-based planning process. 
A well constructed design space will recognize “the full dimensionality of 
uncertainty” inherent in the planning process.123  For maritime defense and security, part 
of the uncertainly facing military planners is the difficulty distinguishing between the 
maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security missions.  This 
distinction—or lack thereof—is a critical part of the political-military context of the 
maritime mission, and therefore a critical dimension of a capabilities-focused design 
space.  Before discussing the other assumptions having an impact on the design space, a 
more in-depth look at the similarities and differences between maritime homeland 
defense and security is appropriate. 
C. MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE VERSUS SECURITY 
The line between homeland defense and homeland security is always tenuous, and 
it is especially blurred in the maritime realm.  Both the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and DoD have a role in protecting the U.S. from maritime threats.  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort 
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”124  DoD 
defines homeland defense as “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic 
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population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or 
other threats as directed by the President.”125  Since external threats and aggression 
include terrorism, the main distinction between homeland security and homeland defense 
is that the former focuses on prevention and recovery, while the latter emphasizes a 
military response to known threats.  DoD specifically precludes itself from homeland 
security (with the exception of assisting during recovery), stating it “does not have the 
assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming across our borders, to stop terrorists 
from coming through US ports, or to stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or 
outside the United States.”126  Instead, DoD “executes military missions that dissuade, 
deter, and defeat attacks upon the United States, our population, and our defense critical 
infrastructure.”127 
While the distinction between homeland defense and homeland security makes 
sense on paper, it is often difficult to apply in the real-world.  This is especially true with 
respect to the distinctions between maritime security and maritime defense.  For example, 
consider a scenario where terrorists intend to use a ship as a weapon.  Presume the U.S. 
government receives intelligence that terrorists have taken control of a ship inbound to a 
port on the west coast of the United States.  At this point, whose responsibility is it to 
stop the ship from entering the port?  On the one hand, DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard 
appear to have a clear role, since they are tasked with preventing terrorist attacks on the 
homeland.  On the other hand, DoD could claim a role since it is responsible for defeating 
attacks in progress. 
The Maritime Operational Threat Response for the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security attempts to resolve this ambiguity by giving DoD the responsibility for 
“maritime terrorist threats that occur in the forward maritime areas of responsibility.”128  
Accordingly, the Chief of Naval Operations has stated that the Navy “will identify, track, 
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and intercept dangers long before they threaten our homeland.”129  While DoD is 
responsible for the forward areas, the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) 
plan assigns DHS the responsibility to interdict maritime threats in waters subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction, drug interdiction areas, offshore waters, and the Caribbean Sea.130  
Nonetheless, the MOTR plan is somewhat equivocal on this point, allowing exceptions to 
its pre-designated lead agency responsibilities based on existing law, desired outcomes, 
greatest potential magnitude of the threat, response capabilities required, asset 
availability, and authority to act.131 
These exceptions have the potential to create confusion over who has lead agency 
responsibilities.  During a 2005 exercise, Coast Guard and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) ship-boarding teams reportedly clashed over who had the lead after 
the mock hijacking of a 200-foot ferry off the Connecticut coast.132  According to a 
Department of Justice (DOJ) inspector general (IG) report, the FBI wanted to employ its 
Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), while the Coast Guard wanted to make use of its Enhanced 
Maritime Safety and Security Team.  FBI officials expressed concern that the MOTR 
plan did “not define the roles of the FBI and the Coast Guard as clearly as they would 
like.”133  The IG report concluded that “a lack of jurisdictional clarity in the MOTR 
could hinder the ability of the FBI and the Coast Guard to coordinate an effective 
response to a terrorist threat or incident in the maritime domain.”134   
Even in the forward areas assigned to DoD for maritime defense, situations often 
arise where a non-DoD led team is desirable.  For example, under Title 14 of the U.S. 
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Code, the Coast Guard is simultaneously a military service and law enforcement 
organization.135  Thus, in situations where a suspect vessel requires boarding to search 
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other threatening cargo, a Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) embarked on a Navy vessel normally leads the effort.   
The Coast Guard first established LEDETs in 1982 as a means of carrying out the Coast 
Guard’s counter drug mission.  Since U.S. Navy ships often transited drug enforcement 
areas, deploying LEDETs on these vessels vastly increased the Coast Guard’s law 
enforcement reach.136  Members of Coast Guard LEDETs “conduct boardings and carry 
out law enforcement activities that members of the Navy are not authorized to do.”137  In 
such cases not only do Coast Guardsmen lead the boarding party, but “the Naval warship 
hoists the Coast Guard flag onto its signal halyard in a fashion observable by the target 
vessel (even illuminating the Coast Guard flag at night).”138   
Illustrative of the value of Coast Guard LEDETs for maritime homeland defense 
is their role in counter-WMD proliferation efforts under the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  The PSI is an activity where participating nations board and search ships 
suspected of WMD smuggling.  By formally committing to the Statement of Principles, 
PSI participants agree to work together to interdict “the transfer or transport of WMD, 
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern.”  This includes a commitment to “board and search any vessel 
flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas . . . that is reasonably suspected 
of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern” 
and to consent to search of their own-flagged vessels by other states if required.139  The 
most recent Coast Guard LEDET participation in the PSI was in August 2005 during 
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exercise DEEP SABRE.  In this exercise the U.S. Navy destroyer USS John Paul Jones 
(DDG-53) hosted an embarked Coast Guard LEDET ship-boarding team.140  This 
example suggests that for legal reasons the Coast Guard might be a more appropriate lead 
than DoD for ship boardings and searches.  As mentioned early, legality is one of the 
criteria in the MOTR plan for determining the lead federal agency for maritime missions. 
As the above discussion highlights, the distinction between maritime defense and 
maritime security is often blurred.  The difficulty inherent in distinguishing between 
these missions presents several operational problems to maritime defense planners.  The 
level of force acceptable in different scenarios varies widely based on the nature of the 
threat, quality of intelligence available on the threat, and proximity of the threat to the 
homeland.   These factors will be critical to the development of a maritime homeland 
defense CONOPS. 
D.  CONSTRUCTING THE DESIGN SPACE 
In addition to the tension between maritime defense and security, the design space 
is affected by enemy objectives and strategies, force characteristics, force effectiveness, 
and the environment.  Since “al Qaeda remains America’s most immediate and serious 
threat,”141 the following discussion of each of these design space dimensions will center 
on that organization.  It is important to note, however, that the design space constructed 
below applies equally to any state or non-state actor engaging the U.S. through 
asymmetric maritime attack.  The identity of the attacker is not important.  What is 
important is that those who cannot compete with the U.S. in head-to-head conventional 
combat share a will and capability to attack the U.S. using unconventional, asymmetric 
means. 
1. Objectives and Strategies 
Like most state and non-state actors, Bin Laden’s network has clearly-defined and 
specific strategic objectives.  Peter Bergen, a journalist who has met with al Qaeda’s 
leader, notes “bin Laden cares little about . . . cultural issues.”142  The terrorist leader 
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does not “rail against the pernicious effects of Hollywood movies, or against Madonna’s 
midriff, or against pornography.”143  Rather than a war of cultures, Bin Laden’s is “a 
political war.”144  Al Qaeda’s long term goal is to establish a Muslim Caliphate in the 
Middle East.  The shorter term objectives that support this goal include the overthrow 
secular and corrupt Muslim governments (those that do not apply Islamic law) and the 
removal of U.S. troops from the region.145  These al Qaeda objectives help to define the 
design space by broadly delineating expected al Qaeda courses of action.  Since the 
removal of U.S. forces from the Middle East would further the organization’s long and 
short term goals, planners need to ask how al Qaeda could affect an American withdrawal 
from the region.  Two broad courses of action are available:  direct attacks on forces in 
theater, or asymmetric attacks on the support base of those forces on U.S. territory.  The 
attack on the USS Cole is an example of the former; the 9/11 attacks represent the latter 
strategy. 
Al Qaeda also has shorter term organizational goals, and these it shares with other 
asymmetric-type threats to U.S. national security.  Foremost, al Qaeda and other 
asymmetric threats want to survive.146  Because these threat types are weak relative to the 
United States, this survival objective is in tension with their political objectives.  For 
example, mounting a large-scale conventional assault on U.S. forces would be the most 
effective means of driving the U.S. out of the Gulf region.  Fortunately, al Qaeda cannot 
mount such an attack.  Not only would the attack fail in the face of U.S. conventional 
superiority, but the organization would likely be decimated in the process.  Thus, as long 
as the U.S. faces state or non-state enemies that are relatively weak, the U.S. must expect 
a strategy of asymmetric attack against key vulnerabilities.  As the National Defense 
Strategy stated, the U.S. “enjoy[s] significant advantages vis-à-vis prospective 
competitors . . . [but has] learned that an unrivaled capacity to respond to traditional 
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challenges is no longer sufficient.”147  In the case of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., al 
Qaeda has clearly stated the purpose of the attacks was to wage asymmetric warfare.  Al 
Qaeda military commander Sayf Al Adl identified a desire to “carry out a damaging 
strike against the United States in retaliation for its perceived aggression in the Islamic 
world,”148 and bin Laden himself has made statements revealing “sophisticated 
consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its 
allies.”149   
One troubling component of al Qaeda’s asymmetric strategy is the potential use of 
WMD.  As Jessica Stern has argued, mass casualty attacks are entirely rational given Al 
Qaeda’s effort to undermine the U.S. government.  Ramzi Yousef, an al Qaeda associate 
convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, hoped his efforts 
would topple the buildings and kill 250,000 Americans.150  Acquisition of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons would make such massive killing significantly easier, 
helping al Qaeda meet its strategic objectives.  Al Qaeda clearly understands this.  The 
introductory chapter of this thesis outlined several of al Qaeda’s previous attempts to 
acquire WMD.  Additionally, in a 1999 interview with Newsweek International, bin 
Laden stated “[w]e don’t consider it a crime if we tried to have nuclear, chemical, 
biological weapons.”151  The possibility of a WMD attack—and the catastrophic 
consequences thereof—are an elemental part of the capabilities-based design space. 
2. Force Characteristics  
According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the terrorist threat 
is “is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and 
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characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups.”152   Similarly, 
Marc Sageman concluded the “global Salafi jihad consists of four major clusters 
surrounded by innumerable islands consisting of cliques and singletons.”153  These 
networked organizations are highly efficient.  “They know how to swarm and disperse, 
penetrate and disrupt, connect and disconnect, as well as elude and evade.”154  The 9/11 
attacks demonstrated this new way of war.  During the attacks on New York and 
Washington, “transnational terrorists, organized in widely dispersed, networked nodes, 
swarm[e]d together swiftly, on cue, then pulse[d] to attack simultaneously.”155   
Terrorists are not the only potential threat to the U.S. focused on asymmetric 
strategies.  The People’s Republic of China “has a long theoretical and historical tradition 
of seeking asymmetric responses to strategic challenges.”156  Indeed, the Chinese 
strategist Sun Tzu wrote over two and half millennia ago “[a]ttack him where he is not 
prepared; go by way of places where it would never occur to him you would go.  These 
are the military strategist’s calculations for victory.”157  More recently, the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been experimenting with new weapons and tactics, 
including more agile military formations, more accurate weaponry, and non-lethal 
weaponry.158  Additionally, China has focused on networking its command and 
informational structures.  The PLA goal is “to seize information superiority” using a 
network-centric concept that “emphasizes integrating combat operations by merging 
command, forces, objectives, and actions.”159  Either state or non-state actors could 
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easily adapt the networked mode of attack to the maritime domain.  Consequently, any 
CONOPS for maritime homeland defense must take this into account. 
3. Force Effectiveness 
Terrorist groups face several operational challenges.  Efficiency is difficult to 
come by when under constant attack from nation-states.  Jacob Shapiro of Stanford 
University has argued that terrorists nearly always suffer from suboptimal performance 
during government crackdowns.160  Similarly, insurgency expert J. Bowyer Bell has 
written extensively on the challenges of operating underground, as all terrorist groups 
must do if they wish to survive.161   Additionally, terrorist groups suffer from the same 
tendency toward entropy common to all organizations.  Group must constantly battle this 
entropy in order to remain effective.162  Often, groups fail in this endeavor.  Terrorist 
organizations find themselves “subject to a range of influences that may be only 
tangentially related to its stated strategic objectives.”163  They compete with each other, 
compounding an inherent action-oriented bias that “encourages taking extreme risks.”164  
This bias toward operational risks eventually “begins to interfere with [a terrorist 
group’s] ability to survive.”165   
Some groups, however, overcome these challenges.  Al Qaeda was able to 
develop into a sophisticated transnational terrorist organization largely due to the 
availability of safe haven in Afghanistan.166  Asymmetric challenges from state actors 
will likely possess similar sophistication.  Additionally, some non-state groups have 
found success using suicide bombings.  Even though these attacks seem irrational and 
self-defeating to Westerners, in reality 
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[s]uicide bombings are inexpensive and effective.  They are less 
complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations.  
They guarantee media coverage.  The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart 
bomb.  Perhaps most important, coldly efficient bombings tear at the 
fabric of trust that holds societies together.167 
The 9/11 attacks are but the most deadly example of the successful suicide attack 
strategy.  Various non-state groups that overcame the operational challenges of operating 
underground were also able to learn that suicide terrorism can succeed, sometimes in a 
spectacular manner.168  Similarly dedicated suicide forces from a state that engaged in 
similar asymmetric attacks would yield similar results. 
The capabilities-based planning process should take into account the fact that few 
terrorist groups reach the point where they can seriously threaten the existence of the 
state.  Nonetheless, a small number of state or non-state groups might successfully adapt 
to the operational challenges of the underground.  An effective maritime homeland 
defense CONOPS must anticipate that these groups will likely use suicide tactics as part 
of their asymmetric strategy. 
4. Environment 
The operational environment for maritime defense encompasses more than just 
the physical characteristics of the maritime domain outlined in chapter one.  Any 
CONOPS for maritime homeland defense also will have to comply with relevant 
international law.  The most relevant international law for maritime homeland defense is 
Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter.  Article 51 states that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”169   
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While Article 51 grants broad authority to UN states for self-defense, the 1982 
UN International Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention could place some limits on U.S. 
freedom of action.  This agreement provides for freedom and the seas and innocent 
passage in order to facilitate international commerce.170  Although the United States has 
not yet ratified the LOS Convention,171 it is still bound by the body of international law 
relating to the maritime domain.  According to Devon Chafee of the Nuclear Age Peace 
Foundation, the “International Law of the Sea is one of the most comprehensive and 
well-established bodies of international regulatory norms in existence.”172  The Law of 
the Sea regime rests on both international norms and treaties, including four 1958 
Conventions to which the U.S. is a party.  This body of law “grants several freedoms, 
including the right to navigation on the high seas and rights to transit through 
international straits, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the territorial and archipelagic 
waters of another state.”173  Maritime defense CONOPS must be sensitive to these legal 
requirements and obligations of the United States. 
One of the reasons nations developed international law for the maritime domain is 
their common interest in facilitating global commerce.  The U.S. government shares this 
interest.  As the National Security Strategy states, a “strong world economy enhances our 
national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.”174  More 
explicitly, the National Strategy for Maritime Security begins with the statement that the 
“safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the 
world's oceans.”175  Finally, the MOTR plan directs that all federal agencies “consider 
appropriately the strategic importance of international trade, economic cooperation, and 
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the free flow of commerce” in planning threat response.”176  Thus, maritime commerce is 
a critical dimension of the design space for maritime homeland defense CONOPS 
development. 
5. Design Space 
By examining each of the above factors, planners gain a more complete 
understanding of the relevant considerations for CONOPS development.  Graphically 
depicting these considerations provides a tool for quickly visualizing the issues maritime 
defense CONOPS must consider.  Figure 4 visually communicates that the most effective 
maritime homeland defense CONOPS must simultaneously account for several non-
traditional dimensions of the mission.  Joint and interagency cooperation will be at a 
premium.  Rules of engagement may be ambiguous.  Planners must also account for a 
networked and adaptive enemy with potential WMD capability.  This threat may engage 
in asymmetric tactics, possibly including suicide operations, to meet their objectives.  To 
make matters even more complicated, while countering this threat, it is in the U.S. 
government’s interest to fully comply with international laws and to protect global 
commerce.   
In order to be effective, the maritime homeland defense CONOPS must address 
each and every dimension of this design space.  The most effective CONOPS would 
account for all the considerations resident in each dimension.  Viewing the design space 
Figure 4, maritime homeland defense reveals itself as a complex mission with a multitude 
of considerations and high degree of uncertainty.  These characteristics of the design 
space demand a flexible CONOPS and force structure for maritime homeland defense. 
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Figure 4.   Maritime Homeland Defense Design Space 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The next step in the capabilities-based planning process is to use a concept of 
operations (CONOPS) to determine what capabilities are needed for maritime homeland 
defense.  To make this determination, the Find→Fix→Track→Target→Engage→Assess 
(F2T2EA) description of the “kill chain” provides a useful construct.  Therefore, the next 
chapter of this thesis will examine each step in this kill chain, taking into account the 
limitations imposed by the design space and the full spectrum of threat scenarios 
discussed above.  Enumerating the capabilities required to perform each step in the 
maritime defense kill chain and comparing these requirements to current capabilities will 
reveal any existing gaps in DoD’s capability to perform maritime homeland defense.  
Policy options analysis will then determine whether or not air power is an effective or 
efficient means of bridging these gaps. 
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IV. CAPABILITIES GAPS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Find→Fix→Track→Target→Engage→Assess (F2T2EA) construct 
“mechanizes the operational level ‘kill chain’” by providing a list of sequential events 
required to prosecute any target.177  For conventional military missions, this is relatively 
straightforward.  In the case of maritime homeland defense, however, using F2T2EA 
requires an additional level of flexibility due to the increased uncertainty inherent in the 
asymmetric threat.  Nonetheless, using the F2T2EA model (and keeping in mind both 
design space limitations and applicable threat scenarios) allows planners to identify what 
capabilities are required to prosecute any particular target.  For each step in the F2T2EA 
chain, this chapter will determine the capabilities required for maritime homeland 
defense, identify any gaps between those requirements and currently available 
capabilities, and suggest ways the military can bridge those gaps using surface forces, 
sub-surface forces, or air power.  The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
additional issues policymakers must consider when deciding which capability options to 
pursue. 
B. F2T2EA CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND GAP ANALYSIS  
A recent MITRE Corporation study of Air Force command and control systems 
details the F2T2EA process (Figure 5).  Definitions for each step in the F2T2EA process 
are described in the study:   
National assets/resources detect objectives of potential significance (find). 
These systems identify and determine the location of a target (fix). From 
this location, tracking systems acquire and monitor the object (track). 
Dynamic decision-making then directs resources (target), and applies 
capabilities (engage) in a timely and decisive manner. To assure the 
desired effect, an assessment (assess) occurs during or after engagement to 
determine whether the target should be reattacked.178 
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Using these definitions as a baseline, the following sub-sections will examine each step in 
the engagement chain.  Each sub-section will offer an expanded definition for each of 
these steps that accounts for peculiarities specific to asymmetric homeland defense 
threats in the maritime domain, identify current capabilities and gaps, and suggest ways 
to overcome these gaps.   
   
Figure 5.   F2T2EA Process (MITRE Corporation)179 
 
Throughout the subsequent discussion, it will be useful to remember that there are 
two basic ways to bridge a capabilities gap.  The first and most commonly of these is 
technological improvement.  Development of a new weapon or platform falls into this 
category.  Unfortunately, technological improvement is usually the most expensive and 
least timely means of resolving capability shortcomings.  The second way to bridge a 
capabilities gap is by using existing technologies or forces in innovative ways.  The Air 
Force did this when it outfitted B-52 bombers with infrared targeting pods, combining 
long range and precision strike technologies onto one platform for the first time.180  U.S. 
Central Command also demonstrated the power of this method when it deployed eleven 
U.S. Special Forces A-teams to Afghanistan in the fall of 2001.  This move represented a 
shift from the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, and it enabled the military to 
collapse the Taliban regime in the span of only a few weeks.181  This innovative 
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approach to warfare bridged the capability gap imposed by political and geographical 
constraints that prevented the deployment of large numbers of conventional forces.  This 
chapter will suggest recommendations using both approaches—operational innovation 
and technological improvement—throughout its discussion of each step in the F2T2EA 
process. 
1. Find 
The capability to find a threat tells the military not only where to look, but that it 
even needs to be looking.  The U.S. government must be able to find asymmetric threats 
before any other steps in the kill chain can occur.  Cueing sensors and shooters to fix, 
target, and engage a maritime threat requires at least general knowledge of its existence.  
In F2T2EA, “find” equates to detecting the existence of “an objective of potential 
significance.”182  In the case of maritime homeland defense, finding a threat means 
detecting its existence early enough to allow forces to fix, track, engage, and assess 
prior to it threatening the homeland.  The definition of “early enough” is contingent 
upon amount of time required to complete the remaining steps in the kill chain.   The U.S. 
currently uses three main tools to find threats:  programs run by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), an emerging maritime domain awareness (MDA) initiative, and 
technical intelligence collection capabilities.  Each of these tools has inherent strengths 
and weaknesses. 
The first line of defense for finding maritime threats is CBP.  The agency’s goal is 
to identify and disrupt terrorist maritime defense schemes before they even start.  To this 
end, CBP has programs in place to ensure it “screens 100 percent of all cargo before it 
arrives in the U.S using intelligence and cutting edge technologies.”183  For example, 
through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), CBP and member state customs 
personnel can examine high risk containerized cargo before it leaves port bound for the 
                                                 
181 For a discussion of the Afghanistan campaign, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of 
Warfare:  Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania:  U.S. Army War 
College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002). 
182 Ibid. 
183 U.S. Customs and Borders Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Securing U.S. 
Ports,” fact sheet, 12 July 2006, available from http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/ 
port_security/securing_us_ports.xml (accessed 17 August 2006). 
44 
U.S.184  Nonetheless, even if CBP was able to implement these initiatives with 100 
percent effectiveness, the agency’s focus on hazardous or suspicious cargo makes it less 
likely it would detect other threats, such as unconventional fighters planning to use a ship 
as a weapon or as a means of infiltration.  Furthermore, while a significant number of 
foreign countries participate in these programs, there are still a large number of ports that 
do not.  A group planning an attack could simply choose to launch its attack from a non-
participating port. 
In addition to CBP, various other government intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies collect data that may be pertinent to maritime homeland defense.  A recent U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Coast Guard conference recognized that DoD, 
DHS and various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community all share the 
responsibility for finding maritime homeland defense threats.  Accordingly, the 
conference called for collecting and analyzing intelligence in a collaborative information 
environment.185  The collaborative environment under construction to ensure intelligence 
fusion and sharing between different organizations is known as maritime domain 
awareness (MDA).  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 defines MDA as “the 
effective understanding of anything associated with the global Maritime Domain that 
could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”186  An 
effective MDA surveillance system identifies threats by looking for anomalous patterns 
of behavior and fusing that information with other intelligence, such as that derived from 
human or technical sources.187  For example, vessels that failed to comply with standard 
procedures, vessels operating from non-friendly ports, or vessels crewed by suspect 
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personnel would trigger a flag in the MDA system, prompting a response.188  Primary 
responsibility for fusing and analyzing maritime intelligence under MDA belongs to the 
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), which includes intelligence elements 
form the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. 
Customs.189  Additionally, the Coast Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers 
(MIFC) for the Pacific and Atlantic coasts can analyze and fuse data from “local and 
international maritime, intelligence and law enforcement partners.”190   
It is important to remember that there are two parts to the MDA problem:  
tracking maritime traffic in general and discerning which specific maritime track is a 
threat.  Fusing information on vessels, cargo, and crew members could reveal some 
maritime defense threats, but it is unlikely to find them all.  The asymmetric maritime 
enemy will seek to maintain his anonymity among the massive volume of legitimate 
maritime traffic.  Discerning which vessel is a threat is a key challenge, similar to other 
cases of unconventional warfare.  Mao Tse Tung famously noted that guerrillas are the 
“fish” that swim in the “sea” of a country’s population.191  In the case of maritime 
homeland defense, the “fish” are threat vessels that hide on the actual sea.  To defeat all 
or part of the MDA system, a hostile force merely needs to avoid suspicious behavior.  
By following all appropriate procedures, operating from friendly (or at least non-enemy) 
ports, crewing ships with personnel traveling under alias, or stowing away on a ship with 
a legitimate crew, unconventional bands of fighters could slip under the MDA radar and 
carry out their mission prior to detection.   
Similar limitations exist with respect to technical collection methods.  While 
space-based assets have the advantage of global reach and “avoid international norms for 
                                                 
188 Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C:  Department of Homeland Security, October 
2005), 3. 
189 Office of Naval Intelligence, National Maritime Intelligence Center, “Our Mission,” Fact Sheet, 
available from http://www.nmic.navy.mil/mission.htm (accessed 14 September 2006). 
190 Clare Maranda, “Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center opened,” Pacific Tides, online edition (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 1 November 2003), available from http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/news/ptol/features/ 
MaritimeFusion/ (accessed 14 September 2006). 
191 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Baltimore, Maryland:  Nautical 
and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), 113. 
46 
violating national/sovereign airspace,”192 they are better suited to finding conventional 
targets than asymmetric threats.  The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) operates 
several Advanced KH-11 satellites with optical and infrared imaging capability, as well 
as several of Lacrosse radar-imaging spacecraft with the ability to “search for evidence of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development, along with missile 
production.”193  These satellites “provide . . . coordinated, repetitive image resolutions as 
good as 4-6 in. during the day and 2-3 ft. or so at night using infrared and radar 
sensors.”194  Unfortunately, orbital patterns may not meet requirements for persistence, 
timing, or location in maritime homeland defense.  “[M]ost low Earth orbit (LEO) 
satellites have a specific target in view for less than 10 minutes at a time and revisit the 
same sites only infrequently.”195  Furthermore, in a conventional maritime battle, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) or imagery intelligence (IMINT) can “find” targets of significance: 
a conventional naval vessel emits various signals making it detectable by SIGINT, and 
any imagery of the vessel will likely reveal the naval vessel’s type if not its specific 
identification.  Against an asymmetric maritime homeland defense threat, however, 
neither SIGNINT nor IMINT are likely to provide much utility.  For example, neither 
would detect a small group of terrorist stowaways intent on commandeering a vessel in 
order to use it as a weapon.  
As demonstrated above, the capability gaps in the U.S.’s current ability to find 
maritime threats are significant.  CBP programs suffer from their exclusive focus on 
cargo, and are unlikely to detect plotters intent on using a ship as a weapon or for 
infiltration.  Furthermore, these programs cannot protect the U.S. from threats emanating 
from non-participating ports, as is likely in the case of state-based or state-sponsored 
attackers.  Unfortunately, the MDA system does not close these gaps, as unconventional 
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fighters could defeat its ability to find them by avoiding suspicious behavior in order to 
“blend in” with other maritime traffic.  Technical collection means also suffer from their 
inability to detect unconventional threats.  To bridge these capabilities gaps, the U.S. 
should to focus its efforts in three main areas.  First, the U.S. needs to concentrate on 
various types of human intelligence (HUMINT) sources.  Second, the U.S. should make 
every attempt to penetrate enemy communications.  Finally, the U.S. can enhance its 
technical surveillance capabilities in the maritime domain through the incorporation of 
air-breathing assets.  
HUMINT sources useful for learning of the existence of maritime threats include 
clandestine, observer, and official sources.  Clandestine HUMINT sources that penetrate 
enemy networks will often have the best visibility into a group’s objectives and 
operational plans.  Observer HUMINT sources working in foreign ports can provide 
critical information on suspicious activities or behaviors that could uncover an 
asymmetric maritime plot.  Official sources—friendly nation intelligence and law 
enforcement services—will often have the most insight into the activities and intentions 
of local terrorist groups and neighboring hostile countries.  DoD recognizes that “sharing 
of information and cooperation with allied nations in regards to maritime activities could 
greatly assist in the early detection and interception of maritime threats.”196  
Additionally, as non-state networks become more “diverse and distributed,” international 
information-sharing “will be essential to address the very difficult problem of strategic 
and tactical warning in relation to new forms of terrorism.”197   
A second area of focus for improving the U.S. ability to find threats in the 
maritime domain is penetration of enemy communications (COMINT).  The government 
can gain insight into enemy plans and objectives by using technical means to penetrate 
enemy communications.  Terrorist groups use a variety of methods to communicate 
including cell phones,198 satellite phones,199 and the internet.200  Developing methods for 
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intercepting and exploiting terrorist communications in these domains would 
significantly enhance the government’s ability to detect maritime threats.  This should be 
a major focus area for information warfare operations in cyberspace. 
The final area for improving the U.S. ability to find maritime threats is by 
improving it ability to persistently monitor the maritime domain.  Unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS), manned systems, and near-space platforms all can assist in bridging this 
capability gap.  UAS possess range, altitude, and payload capabilities that make them 
useful for finding maritime defense threats.  For example, the RQ-4A Global Hawk has 
the capability to “fly 1,200 miles to an area of interest and remain on station for 24 
hours.”201  Global Hawk sensors include a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with ground 
moving target indicator (GMTI) capability as well as electro-optical (EO) and infrared 
(IR) cameras.  Using these sensors, the RQ-4A “can image an area the size of Illinois 
(40,000 nautical square miles) in just 24 hours.”202  The Global Hawk radar is reportedly 
capable of resolutions down to one foot, and the aircraft’s GMTI mode is able to track 
moving vehicles down to four knots, more than adequate for most seaborne vessels.  The 
Global Hawk’s EO and IR payload resolution is reportedly as good as .4 meters.203  
Finally, the Global Hawk has already proven itself in the maritime domain, performing 
sea surveillance during several maritime exercises.  In April 2001, the UAS demonstrated 
its global reach, flying “7,500 miles nonstop across the Pacific to Australia.”204   
Recognizing the potential for UAS in the maritime domain, both the Coast Guard 
and Navy have programmed future purchases. The Coast Guard plans to buy four 
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Mariner aircraft, a derivative of the Predator B, as part of its Integrated Deepwater 
Initiative.205  The U.S. Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program has a 
requirement for “enough systems to cover five major areas of the world 24 hours a day, 
year round.”206  Although the Navy has not further quantified the number of UAS it plans 
to purchase, estimates suggest BAMS will “require dozens of aircraft and associated 
systems that could cost more than $50 million each.”207 
Manned aircraft also offer a capability to find maritime defense threats.  Although 
precise details are classified, the manned U-2 reconnaissance aircraft reportedly has an 
EO imaging capability of 120 km, a radar imaging capability of 180 km, and a SIGNIT 
capability out to 280 km.208  Additionally, although primarily known for its ability 
against ground targets, the E-8C Joint STARS has a potential maritime search and track 
capability as well.209  The E-8 radar field-of-view covers over 19,000 square miles and 
can detect targets over 250 km away.210   
Near-space platforms (usually a rigid airship or blimp) operating above 75,000 
feet and below 62.5 miles offer a way to significantly increase maritime surveillance 
capability.  In part, this is because near space platforms are more persistent that space-
based assets, UAS, or manned aircraft.  Additionally, because these platforms “are 10–20 
times closer to their targets than a typical 400-kilometer LEO satellite” they “can be 10–
20 times smaller for similar performance, or the same size optics can get 10–20 times 
better resolution.”211  Once on station, these platforms “can stay for a very long time,” 
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conceivably up to six months or more.212  Furthermore, because of their extreme altitude 
near-space assets have an extremely wide field of view.  At 120,000 feet a near-space 
platform would have a footprint 1,700 miles in diameter.213  Finally, near-space 
platforms are relatively cost effective.  According to a spokesman the U.S. Air Force 
Space Battlelab project, at a cost of $500,000 for each 175-foot long near-space airship, 
“[y]ou could probably roll about 40 of these off the line for the price of one Global 
Hawk.”214  Thus, near-space assets have the potential to contribute significant amounts of 
information to the MDA picture in a cost effective manner. 
2. Fix and Track 
Determining the location of a target, then acquiring and monitoring it, comprise 
the fix and track portions of F2T2EA.  For maritime homeland defense, the fix and track 
steps equate to geospatially locating the target over time with adequate fidelity for 
maritime interception and/or interdiction.  Without precise geo-location of a given 
target, subsequent steps in the kill chain are not possible.215  The difficulty of this task is 
directly related to the quality of intelligence.  In the best case scenario, intelligence will 
identify a specific vessel of concern, at which point commanders can task assets to fix its 
location and track it.  In other scenarios, however, fixing and tracking a threat vessel will 
require the capability to determine which ship among many is the actual threat to the 
homeland.  Currently the military depends on a combination of spaced-based and 
surface/sub-surface naval assets to fix and track maritime vessels of interest.  
Space-based assets can be useful for fixing and tracking maritime homeland 
defense threats.  Unfortunately, however, due to their high-cost these assets generally are 
not ordered to support any single operation.  Instead, “requirements usually exceed 
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platform capabilities and inventory.”216  When this is the case, space-based assets “may 
not be readily available to operational or tactical commanders.”217  Additionally, while 
space-based assets might be able to fix a target’s location at a particular point in time, 
these systems lack the ability to persistently track a target over time.  This limitation was 
evident during the build-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  During this time period, 
six satellites tasked exclusively against the Baghdad regime resulted in only twelve 
overflights with viewing angles capable of providing “the highest resolution pictures.”218  
Thus, these space-based systems provide only limited capability required to fix and track 
targets in the maritime domain. 
U.S. Navy submarine and surface vessels have significant fixing and tracking 
capabilities.  Typical of submarine surface search radars is the AN/BPS-15.  This X-band 
radar has a range resolution of 10-30 meters (depending on operating mode), more than 
adequate for maritime homeland defense purposes.219  Additionally, most U.S. naval 
surface surveillance radars have detection capabilities of between 100 and 200 km with 
comparable resolution, providing yet another fix and track option for maritime 
defense.220   
The United States reportedly used a combination of space-based and U.S. Navy 
surface vessel tracking in December 2002 against the So San, a North Korean vessel 
traveling between the reclusive Pyongyang regime and Yemen carrying a cargo of Scud 
missiles.221  This fixing and tracking of the So San mirrors the capability required for 
non-traditional maritime defense fixing and tracking.  It is important to note, however, 
that U.S. intelligence provided advanced knowledge of the So San prior to its departure 
from North Korea.  This knowledge would have enabled the U.S. Navy to position ships 
in an appropriate area for tracking the vessel once it departed for Yemen.  In other 
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scenarios, naval vessels may or may not be able to get into a similarly advantageous 
position due to their limited numbers and the relatively limitless size of the maritime 
domain. 
Another significant difference between the So San episode and certain maritime 
homeland defense scenarios is that in the So San case, intelligence provided a specific 
vessel as a target to fix and track.  In maritime homeland defense, however, intelligence 
may only indicate the existence of a threat without precise information on the specific 
vessel.  In this case, intelligence may only know general information on the timing of the 
threat or its presumed target.  For example, a foreign intelligence service might inform 
the U.S. government that it has credible information a group of terrorists stowed away on 
a vessel bound for the West coast sometime in the last forty-eight hours.  More precise 
information on the type of vessel may or may not be available, leading to a high number 
of suspect vessels.222   
Standoff sensors, whether space-based, air-breathing, surface or subsurface will 
have only limited utility under these circumstances.  Few if any external indicators will 
exist that distinguish the actual threat vessel from surrounding suspect vessels.  A vessel 
being used as a launch platform conceivably could have some visual or emission-based 
distinguishing features, but it is just as likely no such features will exist at all.  Similarly, 
on-board explosives or WMD might or might not be visible via spectral or air-sample 
analysis.  Cases where a band of unconventional fighters is on-board a vessel (with the 
intent to commandeer it or use it to infiltrate personnel) are also problematic.  Except in 
cases where members of the group foolishly expose themselves (either to visual 
observation on the vessel surface or through some type of exploitable communications 
link such as satellite phone), stowaway groups of fighters will likely remain undetected 
and undetectable from standoff sensors. 
When standoff sensors are inadequate to fix a threat vessel’s location, DoD will 
require the capability to board and inspect suspect vessels.  Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs, see Chapter III) are an appropriate tool for this 
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mission.  Similarly, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps both maintain a robust visit, board, 
search, and seizure (VBSS) capability.223  For example, SEAL teams can conduct either 
overt of covert VBSS, using helicopters, surface, or subsurface insertion methods.224  
Nonetheless, the use of boarding parties has limitations.  Recent modeling of various 
maritime defense scenarios at the Naval Postgraduate School found two significant 
shortcomings in the military’s current capability to deliver boarding parties to suspect 
vessels.  First, with timely and specific intelligence the U.S. Navy had the ability to 
deliver boarding parties to suspect vessels with adequate inspection time.  Most scenarios 
resulted in a requirement to board and search approximately twenty vessels.  Late 
intelligence warning, however, resulted in an inadequate amount of time to inspect all the 
suspect ships.  Second, a simultaneous attack from multiple ports increased the number of 
vessel boarding requirements, which also overwhelmed current capabilities.225  In both of 
these instances, the size of the maritime domain made it impossible to move limited 
boarding forces with the requisite speed to meet operational requirements.   
As the discussion above highlights, the U.S. military currently has two major gaps 
in its capability to fix and track maritime homeland defense threats.  The first of these is 
an inability to rapidly respond over a large distance in order to fix and track the location 
of specific vessels.  The second is a limited ability to determine which vessel among 
many suspects is the actual hostile threat to the homeland.  The military can bridge these 
gaps by using long-range UAS and manned aircraft for sea surveillance and by 
developing faster means for the delivery of boarding parties. 
The range and speed of UAS makes them extremely useful in scenarios requiring 
rapid response over long distances against identified (or identifiable) threats.  The RQ-4 
Global Hawk has the range and payload to fix a target’s location almost anywhere on the 
globe.  Indeed, U.S. commanders used these impressive capabilities with great effect 
during OIF.  Although Global Hawk “accounted for only 5 percent of intelligence sorties 
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[in OIF], it produced 50 percent of the information on time-sensitive targets.”226  The 
MQ-1 Predator may also meet maritime homeland defense requirements.  This UAS has a 
range of 400 NM and is equipped with a day variable-aperture TV camera, a variable-
aperture infrared (IR) camera, and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) known as the 
Lynx.227  “In spotlight mode from an altitude of 25,000 ft., the Lynx can produce 1-ft.-
resolution imagery at standoff distances of up to 35 miles.”228  In inclement weather, the 
radar has 4-inch resolution at ranges up to 16 miles.229  All three sensors can produce still 
pictures, and the two cameras can also produce full motion video.230  With loiter times of 
approximately 14 hours, the MQ-1 is ideally suited to medium range ISR missions.231  
An updated version of this aircraft, the MQ-9 Predator B, has increased payload, a higher 
operating altitude, and the ability to loiter for up to 32 hours.232   Both the Predator and 
Predator B can fly above visual or aural detection ranges (25,000 feet and 50,000 feet 
respectively), making them ideal choices to shadow and track suspect vessels.   
Manned aircraft also offer capabilities applicable to fixing and tracking known 
maritime threats.  Most fighter and bomber aircraft can use radar to generate high-quality 
targeting information on surface tracks.233  Many have IR and TV targeting capabilities 
as well.234  While these latter capabilities have limited applicability for broad area search, 
once cued to a target’s general location they can aid in target identification.  For example, 
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the IR/TV capable Sniper advanced targeting pod has a “‘recognition range’ 2-3 times 
longer than that of legacy targeting pods.”235  With the Sniper pod at 15,000 feet, it is 
possible to count numbers of personnel and identify vehicle types.236  Additionally, the 
U.S. Navy’s P-3 aircraft and the future multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA), 
scheduled for service in 2010, both have a maritime fixing and tracking capability.237   
In cases where boarding parties are required to determine whether or not a vessel 
is hostile, the greatest need is for a more rapid boarding party delivery capability.  
Typical naval vessels move at a top speed of only 20-22 knots.  Any time enroute to a 
suspect vessel is wasted since the boarding party is inactive during that period.  With a 
top speed of in excess 45 knots, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) partially bridges this 
capability gap.  The LCS is designed around concepts similar those used in the 
development of submarine chasers.  These unique vessels use hydrofoils to lift them 
above the water, allowing them to skim the surface at high speeds.238  The Navy plans to 
purchase 55 LCS.239  In modeling of single-axis, single-vessel attack scenarios, the 
increased speed of the LCS made a significant difference.  The ability of the LCS to 
deliver boarding parties to the target ship sooner either decreased the number of boarding 
teams required (since the same team can leapfrog through a series of suspect vessels) or, 
alternatively, increased the search time per vessel available to the teams.240  Still, even 
with approximately thirty LCS optimally stationed throughout the Pacific for homeland 
defense, a swarming multi-axis maritime attack quickly overwhelmed the U.S. response.  
A simultaneous or near-simultaneous attack from the Atlantic would exacerbate this 
problem.  Although the Navy’s goal is to maintain a cost ceiling of $220 million per LCS, 
                                                 
235 William B. Scott, “Nowhere to Hide,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 161, Iss. 13 (4 October 
2004), 52. 
236 David A. Fulghum, “Sensor Success,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 162, Iss. 21 (23 May 
2005), 55.  
237 Globalsecurity.org, P-3 Orion Fact Sheet, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/systems/aircraft/p-3.htm (accessed 18 August 2006), and P-8 Multimission Maritime Aircraft 
(MMA) Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Fact Sheet, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/systems/aircraft/mma.htm (accessed 18 August 2006). 
238 United States Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, “Dynamic Lift Vehicles,” online directory, 
available from http://www50.dt.navy.mil/toc.html (accessed 15 September 2006). 
239 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report to Congress, RS21305 (Washington, D.C:  Library of Congress, updated 18 August 2006), 2. 
240 Kessler, et al, 250-251. 
56 
the Congressional Research Service predicts costs could rise to as high as $387 
million.241  This cost makes the acquisition of additional LCS for maritime homeland 
defense unlikely. 
While the LCS partially answers the need for more rapid boarding party delivery, 
a true long-range and rapid response capability requires aircraft.  The H-53 series 
helicopters have a top speed of approximately 165 knots, nearly four times the speed of 
the LCS and eight times faster than current vessels.  Although the range of the H-53 
helicopters is limited to 600 miles, this can be extended by aerial refueling.242  Ship or 
shore launched H-53 aircraft could deliver boarding teams to suspect vessels, although 
shore launched operations would require multiple air refueling points.  The Navy and 
Marines use their CH-53 variants for the transport of equipment, supplies and personnel 
in support of amphibious operations.  The Air Force’s MH-53 variant is dedicated to 
special operations.  Imposing an alert requirement for aircraft and crews would take 
resources away from these missions.  The logical choice for this mission is the Navy’s 
and Marine Corps’ approximately 200 CH-53.  Using Navy and Marine assets would 
maintain the traditional roles and missions that give the Navy responsibility for the 
maritime domain and simplify command relationships. 
Another option is the MH-60 helicopter, with a range of 380 nautical miles and 
speed of 145 knots.  Importantly, the LCS is equipped with a helicopter deck configured 
for the MH-60.243  Using the LCS (other vessels are also an option) to ferry boarding 
teams to within helicopter ranges and then using the helicopter for the final delivery of 
the team would provide an additional four hours time for VBSS operations.  The Navy 
currently plans to use the MH-60 for surface and subsurface warfare support, search and  
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rescue, naval special warfare, and logistics,244 although it is also considering maritime 
defense missions for the aircraft.  These include using the MH-60 to deliver boarding 
teams with rigid hull inflatable boats, building on the Navy’s past experience with 
helicopter VBSS.245   
 
Figure 6.   LCS Design with Helicopter Pad (General Dynamics) 
 
One final option for increasing the military’s ability to rapidly deliver boarding 
parties over long distances is the V-22 Osprey.  The Air Force and Marine Corps 
currently are testing their respective versions of the V-22, a tilt-rotor aircraft that can 
takeoff like a helicopter then tilt its rotors forward to cruise like a fixed-wing aircraft.  
Although the V-22’s unrefueled range is similar to the H-53 series helicopters, it has an 
increased cruising speed of approximately 250 knots.246  Using a V-22 variant instead of 
a helicopter to effect final delivery of a boarding party would provide nearly five 
additional hours for VBSS operations over surface-based options.  Furthermore, V-22’s 
launched from land bases with aerial refueling support could deliver boarding parties 
several times faster than surface vessels.  Nonetheless, surface-based logistic support 
would still be desirable, especially in scenarios requiring multiple boardings.  It  would 
be much more efficient for land-based V-22s to recover to surface vessels after delivering 
a boarding party instead of having to fly all the way back to their launching station.   
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Current procurement plans call 348 Marine Corps MV-22, 50 Air Force CV-22, 
and 48 Navy HV-22.  Marine Corps variants will perform the heavy lift mission, 
replacing older helicopters.  The Air Force variant is slated for special operations.  The 
Navy will use its HV-22s for search and rescue and logistics.247  Adding the mission of 
maritime defense to any of the services would require additional aircraft purchases at a 
cost of $40.1 million each.  Still, initial response and delivery of boarding teams using the 
Osprey would do much to enhance U.S. fix and track capabilities for the maritime 
homeland defense mission.   
 
Figure 7.   V-22 Osprey Fast Rope Test (USMC) 
 
3. Target and Engage 
Under the F2T2EA construct, targeting implies a decision-maker directing 
resources against an objective, and engaging consists of applying capabilities against the 
objective “in a timely and decisive manner.”248  While the military traditionally has 
viewed the application of overwhelming force as the appropriate way to target and 
engage the enemy, the maritime homeland defense requirement is more nuanced.  The 
military needs capabilities that support a full-spectrum of rapid response options, from 
minimal non-lethal force to the ability to disable or destroy a threat vessel.  In the 
context of maritime homeland defense, both lethal and non-lethal force capabilities may 
be appropriate, and either could be applied from surface, sub-surface, or air-breathing 
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assets.  Current military target and engagement capabilities are biased towards the lethal 
end of the spectrum, with boarding parties the only non-lethal engagement option. 
Most naval vessels are designed to apply lethal force against maritime threats.  
The RGM-84/UGM-84 Harpoon is a surface-launched missile designed for just such 
purposes, and can be carried by most naval ships.249  Additionally, naval surface and 
subsurface vessels are capable of launching a number of different torpedoes against other 
vessels.250  Nonetheless, surface vessels lack the speed of aircraft, severely limiting their 
geographic coverage during a given time period.  Aerial-refueled fighters, long range 
bombers, or UAS platforms potentially provide the rapid lethal response capability over 
large distances that surface and sub-surface vessels cannot.   
Through the Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) program, 
the Air Force recently adapted the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) guided weapon, for engagement of both maritime and ground 
moving targets.  After release from an aircraft, the AMSTE-equipped JDAM receives 
updates on a target’s location from aircraft equipped with GMTI-capable radar.251  In 
November 2004 a B-52 flew non-stop from Guam and successfully employed AMTSE-
equipped JDAM against the decommissioned USS Schenectady (LST 1185), destroying 
the vessel offshore from Hawaii.252  The Air Force demonstrated a similar capability in 
June 2005 when B-1B bombers successfully dropped CBU-97, a guided cluster munition 
known as the sensor-fuzed weapon, on a moving maritime target in the Gulf of 
Mexico.253  Other weapons are also available to destroy moving targets, including the 
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AGM-65 Maverick and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.254  Finally, the Navy’s P-3, S-3, and 
F/A-18 aircraft and the Air Force’s B-52 bomber are all capable of carrying the AGM-
84D Harpoon anti-ship missile.255   
 
Figure 8.   USS Schenectady being sunk by JDAM from a B-52 aircraft (USAF) 
 
Destroying a vessel is only the option of last resort, however.  Policymakers are 
not likely to approve such actions without perfect intelligence, a chimerical commodity. 
Thus, the largest gaps in the ability to target and engage facing the U.S. military are a 
lack of non-lethal or ship-disabling weaponry.  A second capability gap becomes 
apparent in scenarios where intelligence indicates that an attack is in progress but not its 
origin or target.  These cases are problematic because, in effect, every ship becomes 
suspect.  These scenarios indicate the need for a flexible, last-minutes response 
capability. 
The first way to improve the military’s capability to apply non-lethal forces is 
through faster delivery of boarding teams.  These teams are themselves a potentially non-
lethal or ship-disabling weapon.  After fixing the target’s location, boarding parties can  
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use the minimum required force to subdue a threat.  Accordingly, the LCS, helicopter, 
and V-22 options for rapid and long-range boarding team delivery would also add 
capability for the target, engage, and assess steps in the kill chain. 
In certain scenarios it may not be possible to insert a boarding party.  For 
example, a non-cooperative vessel might maneuver to imperil the lives of the VBSS party 
during their boarding attempts.  Additionally, the use of small arms or man-portable 
missiles can threaten air- and surface-based insertion methods.  In this latter case, rules of 
engagement may allow for declaration of a vessel as a hostile force, implying kill 
authority.  In the former however, non-compliance without hostile behavior may result 
from the crews’ desire to conceal illegal activities (e.g., smuggling) rather than their 
intent to carry out an act of war.   
These considerations suggest that the ability to disable a vessel is extremely 
valuable in the maritime homeland defense mission.  Commanders could authorize the 
disabling of a vessel long before it approach the U.S. coast, neutralizing any potential 
threat to the homeland without destroying the vessel, without destroying any evidence on 
board, and without killing noncombatants.  Once the threat was dead was the water, there 
would be adequate time to dispatch a boarding team to further investigate.  A ship-
disabling capability would solve the problems associated with less time or less actionable 
intelligence as well as the problem of defending from a multi-axis swarming attack.  
Additionally, utilizing a non-lethal or ship disabling capability would better comport with 
the maritime defense requirements to protect global commerce and adhere to peacetime 
international law.   
The most effective way to disable a ship is to neutralize its propulsion or steering 
system.  Accordingly, a small warhead kinetic weapon that homes on a ship’s screws 
would be an appropriate attack method.   While generally conceived as gun employment 
from surface vessels,256 aircraft could also employ gunfire against critical nodes of a ship 
and disable it.  One highly accurate and destructive weapon currently available is the AC-
130 gunship.  The AC-130 “incorporate[s] side-firing weapons integrated with 
sophisticated sensor, navigation and fire control systems to provide surgical firepower or 
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area saturation during extended loiter periods, at night and in adverse weather.  The 
sensor suite consists of a television sensor, infrared sensor and radar.”257  With this 
extremely accurate fire control system, “the AC-130 can place 105mm, 40mm and 25mm 
munitions on target with first round accuracy.”258  Fighter and attack aircraft employing 
strafe are another option.  In general, however, the accuracy of gunfire from a 
fighter/attack aircraft is somewhat less that that from a gunship.  With fixed gun positions 
and limited systems to assist in cueing, fighter/attack strafe accuracy depends primarily 
on visual acquisition of the target and the pilot’s gunnery skills. 
Another option for disabling a ship is the use of non-kinetic weapons.  The Coast 
Guard has experimented with non-explosive devices for fouling propulsion or steering 
systems, including both surface- and air-delivered entanglement systems.  Devices to date 
have focused on small boats.259  The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) is 
examining future entanglement devices,260 but these devices are of questionable use 
against large ocean-going vessels.  Instead, JNLWP is studying the applicability of non-
lethal and less-lethal directed energy weapons for the maritime defense mission.261   
The military should also consider non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 
weapons.   These devices produce a short but intense electromagnetic pulse, “sufficiently 
strong to produce short lived transient voltages of thousands of Volts [and] can result in 
irreversible damage to a wide range of electrical and electronic equipment, particularly 
computers and radio or radar receivers.”262   Any vessel that depended on these systems 
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for navigation would be inherently vulnerable.  Additionally, EMP technology for bomb 
designs is relatively mature.  The Los Alamos National Laboratory first demonstrated 
EMP weapons in the 1950s.  “Since that time a wide range of [EMP weapon] 
configurations has been built and tested, both in the US and the [Soviet Union], and more 
recently CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].”263   
Air-deliverable entanglement systems, directed energy, or EMP weaponry would 
significantly enhance maritime defense capabilities.  Air-delivery of the system would 
enable rapid employment over long distances, overcoming the factors of time and space 
that dominate the maritime domain.  Use of these non-lethal options would result in the 
suspect or threat vessel being dead in the water, after which boarding parties could 
perform their VBSS or law enforcement duties at their leisure. 
In scenarios where intelligence reveals that an attack is in progress but not its 
origin or target, the military needs a rapid and flexible last-minute response capability.  
Non-specific intelligence makes maritime interdiction problematic since every ship 
becomes suspect.  Without interdicting or inspecting every single vessel bound for the 
U.S., there would be no way of knowing which vessel was hostile.  Modeling has 
demonstrated that if stowaway terrorists remain hidden until shortly before their attack, 
response time is limited to approximately 20 minutes.264  Furthermore, without indicators 
to distinguish the attacking ship from others until endgame, VBSS teams are largely 
ineffective since there is inadequate time to deploy them.  One solution to this problem is 
to use non-lethal shore batteries as a defense of last resort.  If a ship came under hostile 
control as it entered the port, an in-place and on-call shore battery could respond in time 
to disable it.265  While such a capability certainly is plausible, the cost (in terms of both 
money and manpower) of defending every port in the U.S. with a shore battery would be 
significant.  At the very least, such a capability is years away.  
Rather than waiting for development of a static defensive system using shore 
batteries, the military should consider using air power to provide a flexible response 
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capability.  Aircraft on combat air patrol (CAP) could rapidly engage vessels that emerge 
as threats as they approach or enter U.S. ports.  Aircraft CAPs are inherently flexible.  
Command authorities can stand them up or down and move them to different geographic 
locations as the threat dictates.  Until non-lethal weapons are fielded, the 20-30mm 
cannon on most fighter/attack aircraft or the various caliber weapons on the AC-130 
gunship could be used to disable last minute popup threats by targeting their bridges or 
engine rooms.  Once non-lethal weapons are available, however, the best aircraft for their 
employment will likely be slow-movers, including either manned or unmanned 
helicopters and light aircraft.  Thus, using fighters, bombers, or gunships for maritime 
defense CAP should only be seen as an interim solution until non-lethal weapons are 
fully mature. 
4. Assess 
The requirement to assess the effects from the engagement phase in maritime 
defense is the least complex of all F2T2EA steps.  For maritime homeland defense, 
assessing simply requires a capability to evaluate whether or the engagement phase 
achieved its desired effects.  In most cases, the sensors used to fix, track, or engage the 
target vessel will also be able to perform this assessment.  The fact that most sensors are 
coupled with their supported shooters makes assessment the least challenged step in the 
F2T2EA chain.  Aircraft or surface/sub-surface vessels delivering ordnance can 
determine whether or not their attack destroyed or disabled a vessel.  Boarding parties 
will know whether or not their efforts succeeded.  Only in cases where long-range 
standoff weapons are used will as discreet assessment phase be required.  In such cases, 
the sensors discussed in the fix/track section above should prove more than adequate. 
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Prior to deciding whether or not to use air assets for maritime defense, the 
military needs to consider two significant operational issues.  The first issue is how to 
affect command and control of airborne maritime defense assets.  The second 
consideration is the cost of using air assets for maritime defense.  These costs consist of 
both fiscal constraints as well as the hidden costs inherent in shifting military forces to 
new missions, including changes to training regimens, additional deployment costs, 
disruption to deployment schedules, and a potential for decreased force availability.  
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1. Command and Control of Airborne Maritime Defense Assets 
The maritime homeland defense mission falls under the jurisdiction of U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).  These 
combatant commands periodically conduct maritime exercises focused on terrorist 
threats.  In 2002, U.S. Pacific Command and the Indonesian Navy focused their bi-lateral 
Cooperation and Readiness and Training Afloat (CARAT) exercise on 
counterterrorism.266   Similarly, the 2004 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 
conducted by the U.S. Third Fleet “enhanced international cooperation in fighting 
terrorism and drug smuggling.”267   
Despite these efforts, current maritime homeland defense capability exists largely 
on an ad hoc basis.  NORTHCOM in particular has been the recipient of criticism for not 
devoting enough attention to the maritime mission.268  The command does not have 
assigned naval forces, instead relying “on contingency planning for future events and 
theoretically acts as a coordinating bridge between the Navy and Coast Guard for 
Maritime Homeland Defense/Security issues.”269  Although the North American 
Regional Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) agreement between the U.S. and 
Canada recently expanded to include a maritime surveillance role, NORAD “will not 
exercise operational control over maritime assets.”270  Furthermore, NORTHCOM 
currently does not equip any of its air defense fighters with air-to-surface ordnance.   
To ensure clear lines of authority, combatant commanders should assign all forces 
performing the maritime defense mission to their Joint Forces Maritime Component 
Commander (JFMCC).  Air Force doctrine already allows for the JFMCC to “plan and 
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direct limited Air Force support operations.”271  Putting all surface- and air-based 
maritime defense forces under the authority of a single component commander ensures a 
coordinated unity of effort during maritime interdiction missions.  Importantly, one 
implication of this recommendation is that forces currently assigned to air defense (e.g., 
NOBLE EAGLE aircraft) should not be “dual-tasked” for both air- and maritime defense 
missions.  Intelligence will drive differing operational requirements for air and maritime 
defense.  Weapons loadouts and aircraft types required for these missions are different.  
Accordingly, separate forces should be assigned to each component for air and maritime 
defense.  
2. Fiscal Constraints and Hidden Costs 
Recommendations for resolving the capabilities gaps in the maritime defense 
F2T2EA kill chain should account for two different sets of constraints.  First, fiscal 
constraints suggest a preference for low-cost innovations over technological or force 
structure fixes (e.g., increased numbers of troops or platforms) whenever possible.  
Second, capabilities-based planning must account for the hidden costs inherent in shifting 
military forces to new missions, including changes to training regimens, additional 
deployment costs, disruption to deployment schedules, and a potential for decreased force 
availability.  With military forces spread thin by virtue of air defense requirements at 
home and worldwide deployments, these fiscal constraints and hidden costs may drive 
the services to oppose picking up a new mission.  Indeed, the Air Force in the past has 
resisted moves to add air-to-surface missions to its fighter assets due to concerns over 
significantly increased operations tempo without appreciable homeland defense 
payoff.272 
Upon close inspection, a significant increase in maritime defense capability 
results from only modest investments of current military assets.  A limited number of 
long-range surveillance missions would be required for proscribed time periods (defined 
by intelligence and surface fleet availability) to find and track suspect vessels.  Similarly, 
placing a single long-range bomber (and any required tanker support) on 24-hour alert 
status for maritime interdiction would ensure rapid, immediate, long-range firepower.  In 
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both cases, these aircraft could operate out of there home bases, with no need to forward 
deploy to the coasts.  If intelligence ever indicated an increase maritime threat, aircraft 
could be added to the alert packages.   
A slightly larger investment is needed to provide maritime CAPs over U.S. ports 
as the last line of defense.  While the number of times fighter/attack or gunship aircraft 
would be required on CAP is limited, additional training would be required for this 
mission.  Aircrew would need to know the appropriate areas to target on large 
commercial vessels in order to disable them.  Additionally, aircrew would need to 
maintain proficiency in air-to-surface gunnery.  Placing fighter/attack or gunship aircraft 
(and required tanker support) on 24-hour alert status for combat air patrols over major 
ports would ensure minimal disruption to daily training schedules. 
Over the long term, expanding and refining the military’s maritime homeland 
defense capability will require additional resources.   Investments in more robust 
intelligence capacity and the purchase of additional platforms such as various UAS, near-
space platforms, the LCS, MH-60, and V-22 could put significant pressures on DoD’s 
acquisition budget.  Additionally, development, testing, and fielding of new non-lethal 
weapons, including entanglement devices, EMP weapons, and their delivery platforms 
will require additional funds.  DoD leaders must understand that failing to provide for the 
acquisition of these resources will mean that the capability gaps discussed above will 
remain unresolved.  If DoD decides to forego acquiring the capabilities recommended in 
this thesis, it must do so with full knowledge that it is accepting an increased risk with 
respect to maritime attacks on the homeland. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The speed, range, and flexibility of air power—whether land- or sea-based—gives 
it a clear role to play in overcoming the challenges inherent in the maritime homeland 
defense mission.  Using an operational F2T2EA framework to examine the maritime 
homeland defense mission highlights the military capabilities required to accomplish 
each sequential step in the kill chain.  Table 1 summarizes the current and required 
capabilities to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess maritime targets, as well as 
potential solutions for bridging the gaps between the two.  Developing CONOPS for 
using air assets for maritime homeland defense, and providing the JFMCC with the 
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required aircraft for the mission, would make significant progress toward bridging 
existing gaps in military capability.  With a relatively limited investment, the military 
could quickly field a rapid, long-range, and flexible response capability for maritime 
defense.  To fully resolve the capabilities gaps will requires additional investment in new 
and existing technologies, including additional platforms and new non-lethal weapons.  
Failure to make this investment will only serve to perpetuate U.S. vulnerabilities to 
attacks on the homeland via the maritime domain. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Several shortcomings hamper the U.S. military’s current ability to perform 
maritime homeland defense.  Gaps between current and required capabilities exist in 
every step of the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) chain.  When 
deciding which capabilities gap to address first, the Department of Defense (DoD) should 
consider which steps in F2T2EA have the largest capabilities gaps as these represent the 
military’s weakest operational areas.  Prioritizing capabilities improvements can then 
guide acquisition, doctrinal development, and operational planning.273 
The most acute maritime defense capability gaps facing the military are in the fix 
and track steps of F2T2EA.  A key requirement of the fix and track step is the ability to 
distinguish vessels posing an asymmetric threat from the large volume of legitimate 
maritime traffic.  The second most significant capability shortfall facing the military is its 
limited ability to engage suspect vessels with non-lethal or disabling force.  Without 
robust capability in this area, certain scenarios limit the military to two unpalatable 
options:  applying lethal force or no force at all.  The third largest capabilities gap is in 
the military’s ability to find maritime defense threats.  Improved performance in this area 
is required to ensure adequate warning of enemy operations and to enable subsequent 
step in the F2T2EA “kill chain.” 
Air power offers a potential means to narrow or bridge the capabilities gaps 
facing the military in each of these areas.  This potential derives from the unique 
operational environment of the maritime domain.  One of the main factors that hampers 
operations in the maritime realm is its size.  This creates a need for speed, range, 
flexibility in any maritime defense force.  These capabilities are inherent to air power.  
Thus, while naval surface and sub-surface forces are indispensable to resolving the 
maritime defense challenge, air power also has a role to play in efforts to find, fix, and 
finish the asymmetric enemy in the maritime domain. 
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1. Air Power Enhancements to Fixing/Tracking 
For the foreseeable future, the most effective means for distinguishing between 
friendly and hostile maritime traffic will be limited to DoD, Coast Guard, or other law 
enforcement agency boarding parties.  To overcome the maritime domain’s operational 
factors of time and space requires both rapid and long-range boarding party delivery 
capability.  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) would significantly enhance this capability.  
Particularly promising is using the LCS to ferry boarding teams to within helicopter 
ranges and then using helicopters to deliver the team to the target vessel.  Finally, the V-
22 Osprey could also increase the time available for VBSS operations.   Although adding 
this mission to the Osprey would require additional aircraft purchases, using V-22 aircraft 
would do much to overcome the factors of time and space which challenge the U.S. 
ability to rapidly fix the location of maritime homeland defense threats.   
2. Air Power Enhancements to Engagement 
In the limited scenarios where command authorities declared a vessel hostile 
(implying kill authority), aerial-refueled fighters, long-range bombers, or UAS platforms 
could provide rapid lethal response over the large distances inherent to the maritime 
realm.  Still, the largest gaps in ability to target and engage maritime threats facing the 
U.S. military are the lack of non-lethal or ship-disabling weaponry.  The first way to 
improve capability in this area is through faster delivery of boarding teams, since these 
teams are themselves a potentially non-lethal or ship-disabling weapon.  Still, this 
represents an imperfect solution at best.   
The most effective means of disabling a ship is to neutralize its propulsion or 
steering system.  Accordingly, a small warhead kinetic weapon that homes on a ship’s 
screws, engine room, or bridge would be an appropriate attack tool.   AC-130 and 
fighter/attack aircraft employing strafe are the most immediately available option of this 
type.  Similarly, using non-lethal entanglement, directed energy, or EMP weapons would 
quickly neutralize any potential maritime threat to the homeland without destroying the 
vessel, without compromising any evidence or intelligence on board, and without 
threatening the lives of noncombatants.  Air-delivery of these systems would enable rapid 
employment over long distances.     
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In scenarios where intelligence indicates an attack is in progress without knowing 
either the specific target of the attack or its port of origin, Combat Air Patrols (CAP) 
provides a flexible response capability.  Command authorities can stand a CAP up or 
down or move it to a different location as the threat dictates.  Aircraft on CAP could 
rapidly engage vessels that emerge as threats as they approach or enter U.S. ports.   Until 
non-lethal weapons are fielded, the 20-30mm cannon on most fighter/attack aircraft or 
the various caliber weapons on the AC-130 gunship could be used to disable threat 
vessels by targeting screws, bridges, or engine rooms.  Once non-lethal weapons are 
available, the best aircraft for their employment will likely be slow-movers, including 
helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft.   
3. Air Power Enhancements to Finding 
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) possess the range, altitude and payload to make 
them potentially useful for finding maritime defense threats.  For example, the RQ-4A 
Global Hawk can fly 1,200 miles and still have an on station time of 24 hours, during 
which the aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electro-optical (EO), and infrared 
(IR) cameras “can image an area the size of Illinois.”274  Manned aircraft such as the U-2 
or E-8 also offer a capability to find maritime defense threats.  Short term, developing 
concepts and procedures for the use of air assets for sea surveillance offers a partial 
solution to the challenge of finding maritime defense threats.  Longer term, the near-
space platform offers significant benefits.  Near-space platforms—usually some type of 
blimp or rigid airship—offer increased persistence over both space-based assets and 
UAS.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
With military air forces spread thin by both air defense requirements at home and 
worldwide deployments, fiscal and hidden costs and other constraints may drive the 
services to resist picking up a new mission.  Upon close inspection, however, a 
significant increase in maritime defense capability results from only modest investment 
of currents assets.  Coupling these short-term actions with long-term investment in new 
weapons and platforms gives the military the opportunity to develop a robust maritime 
defense capability that capitalizes on air power’s inherent speed, range, and flexibility. 
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Three short-term actions would immediately enhance the military’s ability to 
perform maritime defense.  First, the combatant commands should develop concepts of 
operation (CONOPS) that incorporate the services various airborne assets into the 
maritime defense mission.  These CONOPS must include assigning Navy, Marine, and 
Air Force aircraft to the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).  The 
JFMCC can best ensure unity of effort for maritime defense by controlling all surface, 
sub-surface, and air assets involved in the mission. 
Second, the services should provide the combatant commands with long-range 
surveillance and strike capability.  Intelligence and surface fleet positioning would dictate 
when and for what duration combatant command required this capability.  Given the 
present threat environment, these requirements would certainly be limited.  Long-range 
manned and unmanned aircraft from the Air Force (e.g., U-2, E-8, and RQ-4) or Navy 
(e.g., P-3) would need to be assigned to the combatant commands only for proscribed 
time periods as intelligence dictated.  Additionally, the services should place a single 
long-range strike aircraft (plus a spare and associated refueling support) on 12- to 24-
hour alert status for maritime defense.  Air Force B-1, B-52, or MQ-9 aircraft or a Navy 
P-3 would be appropriate.  The ideal platform, however, is the AC-130 since it provides a 
less-lethal engagement option.  Having strike aircraft immediately available to U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) would ensure 
rapid, long-range maritime interdiction capability.  In most cases, long-range aircraft 
could sit alert from home base, with no need to forward deploy to the coasts. 
Third, the services should provide the combatant commands with a maritime 
defense CAP capability.  While the number of times fighter/attack or gunship aircraft 
would be required on CAP is limited, additional training would be required for this 
mission.  Aircrew would need to know the appropriate areas to target on large 
commercial vessels in order to disable them.  Additionally, aircrew would need to 
maintain proficiency in air-to-surface gunnery.  Placing fighter/attack or gunship aircraft 
(and required tanker support) on 12- to 24-hour alert status for combat air patrols over 
major ports would ensure minimal disruption to daily training schedules. 
75 
To build increased effectiveness over the long term, the military should consider 
four investment opportunities.  First, the joint force should develop, test, and evaluate 
employment plans for boarding teams that includes air, surface, and combined air/surface 
delivery options.  Among ideas the military should consider is the use of the V-22 for 
long-range maritime insertions.  Second, the development of non-lethal weapons—
including entanglement devices, directed-energy, and EMP weapons—is imperative.  
Several scenarios demonstrate that without some type of non-lethal weapon, the military 
will not be able to defend the maritime domain against an asymmetric enemy.  Third, the 
military should study the types of platforms that would be most appropriate for maritime 
defense.  Slow-mover aircraft and helicopters—manned or unmanned—seem most 
desirable for performing maritime defense CAP.  Finally, the military should invest in 
flexible and persistent sea surveillance capability.  The near-space platform and other 
high-altitude, high-endurance unmanned systems seem most promising.  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis stepped through the first several steps of the capabilities-planning 
process and identified several promising short- and long-term actions for enhancing the 
military’s maritime defense capability using air power.  The next step in the process is to 
take these suggestions and refine them through war-gaming and simulation.  This would 
enable the military to see the requirements and impacts of implementing the above 
recommendations in detailed form.  Furthermore, this thesis focused (albeit not 
exclusively) on air power options for bridging capabilities gaps.  Additional research 
could more accurately delineate surface and sub-surface options.  Once again, exposing 
these options to robust war-gaming and simulation would reveal in detail the tradeoffs 
between the various approaches to maritime defense. 
Technical assessments of the effectiveness of non-lethal weapons would do much 
to help clarify the most efficient and effective options for maritime defense.  Studies that 
would be most useful to this effort include the utility (or futility) of employing 
entanglement devices against large ocean-going vessels, potential payoffs from directed 
energy weapons in the maritime domain, and the effectiveness of EMP weapons on 
commercial ships.  Other topics for research include a study of the weapons effects of  
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medium-to-large caliber gunfire against the vulnerable areas of large vessels, and the 
feasibility and tradeoffs of various boarding party delivery methods.  These would 
include ship, helicopter, V-22, and various hybrid delivery options. 
D. CONCLUSION 
A joint approach to maritime defense that incorporates air power offers the best 
possible protection of the homeland.  Accordingly, the services need to start thinking 
about their respective roles in maritime defense now.  In the short term, a networked 
force of surface, sub-surface, and air assets can blunt the maritime threat while 
maintaining economy of force.  In the long term, the JFMCC needs to develop a detailed 
employment plan for boarding teams that includes air, surface, and combined air/surface 
delivery options.  Innovative concepts of operation, such as use of the V-22 for long-
range maritime insertions, could significantly enhance maritime defense.  Similarly, 
innovative technological advances could make the joint force an even more effective 
guarantor of U.S. security.  The development of non-lethal weapons is particularly 
important given the elusive nature of the enemy and the new operational environment.  
Combined with naval sea power, air power offers several opportunities to bridge the 
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